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10 January 1980

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No. 2094

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CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC PLANNING FAILURES SURVEYED IN REPORT

Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 30 Nov 79 pp 84-87

[Article by Raul Martell]

[Text] The Caribbean region is composed of a large number of small islands. It is a heterogeneous conglomeration of different ethnic groups, countries of different sizes and political statuses, and different languages and levels of development. Yet their similar historical origin and their cultural community distinguish them from the other countries of the Americas and the world.

However, over a period of years, the colonial mother countries have consciously attempted to divide the Caribbean countries, splintering their peoples' considerable power with this policy.

Attempts at Planning

With the end of World War II, the political, economic and military power of Great Britain and France declined in large measure.

These colonial mother countries' strategy concerning their old overseas dominions became astute, specifically concerning the Caribbean islands.

It is thus that, faced with the danger of these countries' total independence, Great Britain and France, along with the Netherlands, developed a new policy for subjection through the formation of political and economic unions under their mantle.

In 1958, the British West Indies Federation, sponsored by the colonial mother country, was formed for the purpose of maintaining close bonds with the Caribbean countries that were in the process of emancipation. The withdrawal of Jamaica and Trinidad, two of the relatively less-developed [as published] countries in the region, caused a crisis for the federation, which in 1962 dissolved without having fulfilled its purpose.

Meanwhile, following World War II, under the Marshall Plan, the developed European capitalist countries experienced a revitalization of capitalism and i[illegible] movement into a phase in which the bourgeois apologists believed they s[illegible] the possibility of regulation and tempering of economic crises by means of stabilizing mechanisms.

In fact, the capitalist system of the 1950-1960 period superficially enjoy some advances in production levels and employment as well as an increase in international trade and the flow of investments. During those years, even in Latin America such countries as Venezuela, Mexico and Brazil experienced high rates of growth in some areas of their economies.

The rapid development of science and technology contributed to the accelerated growth of the productive forces in the world's leading capitalist countries. Production assumed an increasingly social character and state intervention in sectors essential to development, such as transport, communications, the more advanced industrial sectors, such as chemicals, electronics and others, made it necessary and possible, to an extent, for the most highly developed capitalist countries to begin tempering the growing anarchy of their economies in the midst of a long, complex economic crisis that threatened the foundations of international capitalism, which had once appeared indestructible.

At the same time, the success of the regulating mechanisms developed in the USSR through centralized state planning, along with the increasing use of these principles in the neighboring countries of Eastern Europe and the success of the socialist integration in the CEMA, were external factors that required the developed capitalist countries to consider the need to introduce certain regulatory mechanisms into their anarchic economies.

It is thus that, following the end of World War II, Great Britain, France and the Netherlands, countries with possessions in the Antilles, began to test new mechanisms for the regulation of the economies in their overseas dominions.

It was in this spirit that efforts at planning were initiated in different countries in the region as early as 1947, in the former Dutch Guiana (now Surinam).

Some planning work was begun in Surinam with the active participation of the Dutch mother country. Thus, a plan known as the Prosperity Fund, for the years 1947 to 1955, was developed.

The central, dominant position in this "plan" was occupied by the governor, the queen of Holland's chief representative in the country, who at the same time also functioned as the fund's treasurer.

Shortly after the plan was initiated, a special institution, known as the Central Planning Agency (CPA), was created to carry out these tasks. It was to develop the country's regional and overall plans.

During the late 1940's in Barbados, the small British possession Barlovento, and our neighbor Jamaica, the British crown began to test means of regulating the development of these islands, in accordance with colonial needs, by means of so-called national plans.

In 1945, the first "Draft Plan for 1945-1956" was issued in Barbados. The plan did not actually deal with overall objectives. Apparently, its primary function was the expansion of the sugar industry, an essential activity and the only source of employment in the country at that time.

In Jamaica, the Ten-Year Development Plan was drafted, embracing the period 1947 to 1957.

These plans suffered from a number of limiting factors, beginning with complete colonial dependence on the mother country, the decrepit administrative structure, the nearly total lack of statistical data for all areas of the national economy, the lack of people qualified to draw up and execute the plan, and extending to the economically dependent and complementary nature of the region's economies.

During the 1960's there was a marked surge of interest in development planning in the underdeveloped countries of the so-called Third World.

During this period, in the Caribbean region, as in many other areas, a widespread decolonization process was under way, resulting in the independence, in many cases formal, of a large number of former colonies.

"The complete decay of colonialism is inevitable. After the formation of the worldwide socialist system, the phenomenon of greatest historical importance is the sinking of the system of colonial slavery under the onslaught of the national liberation movement," said the statement issued at the International Conference of Representatives of Workers and Communist Parties, held in Moscow in 1960. Regarding the position of the colonial powers with respect to this situation, it also stated, "The colonial powers do not give freedom to the peoples in their colonies, and they do not voluntarily abandon the countries they exploit."

During this period, in Surinam the Ten-Year Plan (1954-1963) was drawn up. It had the following objectives:

1. To achieve greater economic independence of the mother country.

2. To create, on the basis of local resources, the conditions indispensable to further socio-economic development.

3. To achieve growth in real income and per capita production.

The recently created central planning agency in that country then came under the control of the Netherlanders, who from that time on completely dominated all the planning mechanisms in that continental Caribbean country.

It is also very significant that in the course of efforts to draft a national plan for the island of St. Vincent, a part of the Barlovento Islands group in the British Lesser Antilles, in an ordinance concerning the problems of development of the community, the Act of 1963, the secretary of state for the British Colonies stated, concerning Great Britain's policy on economic development, the following: "[T]he existence of a development plan approved by the legislature and by me is a prerequisite for the approval of loan funds to the territories. I also consider it best that subventions and loans for the Colonial Development Prosperity programs be approved in accordance with the plans that have been approved. . . . In the absence of the approval of the plans, I will be prepared to approve programs of the new Colonial Development and Prosperity Plan only in the exceptional instances of especially important, urgent projects."[1]

Thus, the British crown was the first party interested in the continuation of colonial or neocolonial dependence, and new forms and tools required by progress and scientific and technical advances were assured.

During the 1960's the other countries in the region were in a similar situation.

Objectives

Before independence was achieved, the planning objectives in the Caribbean countries were openly permeated with the needs of the colonial mother countries so that these island economies, in the most efficient, organized manner possible would serve as complements and test laboratories for the colonialists' private interests.

For the Caribbean countries, it was a question of achieving progress in economic development, taking advantage of the changes occurring in the international arena in the balance of power between the capitalists and the socialists, the decline of colonial power accompanied by decolonization, and the fact that the Caribbean region is actually the section of Latin America where there is the largest proportion of government ownership, which in principle facilitates planning.

In the region's countries, there truly existed a more favorable climate for pursuing higher objectives in political, economic and social development.

For these states, planning constitutes the primary tool that would permit them to carry out the necessary changes in Caribbean society.

Thus it is that the primary objectives of planning in this decade can be summarized as follows:

1. To increase institutional and organized governmental participation.

2. To stimulate the industrial development that will make it possible to replace imports and to export finished products.

3. To attract foreign capital (the so-called "industrialization by invitation").

4. To reduce dependence on others and to guarantee an autonomous, diversified economic development.

5. To develop and put into effect measures for the control of the government and private sectors.

6. The creation of additional jobs and the reduction of unemployment.

7. The satisfaction of the population's basic needs.

Types of Caribbean Economies

Entirely Mineral	Entirely Tourist	Entirely Plantation	Agricultural Exports	Mixed Economy
Trinidad and Tobago	Bahamas	St. Kitts	St. Lucia	Jamaica
Aruba	Cayman Islands	Belize	St. Vincent	Guyana
Curacao	Barbados	Dominican Republic	Dominica	Barbados
			Grenada	Puerto Rico
			Haiti	

Because most of the governments retained the same class and power structures inherited from the colonial period, these alleged development-planning objectives only managed to formalize and "modernize" the age-old bonds of dependence with the mother country, for the planning goals were established within a capitalist, dependent context.

These issues are discussed in various works by economists in the region. We cite as examples the works of Dr. George L. Beckford, published in CARIBBEAN ECONOMY by the Institute of Social and Economic Research of the University of the West Indies in Kingston, Jamaica, and his report presented at the First Meeting of Planning Experts of the Caribbean, held 25 to 31 January 1979 in Havana. In these works, Beckford develops the characterization of the Caribbean economies seen in the table.

Organization

In the overwhelming majority of the region's countries that met this challenge, the institutional organization of the development-planning works has, generally speaking, clearly formal characteristics.

Planning is located at the highest governmental level, for in many instances the head of the government is in charge of the national planning committees, which in turn are supported, from a technical point of view, by planning bodies, units or agencies charged with the preparation of the corresponding plans.

This hierarchic system, reaching to the highest possible level in the government, is in fact, as we shall see later in the section concerning limitations, inefficient, technocratic and bureaucratic. This is based on systems that have been imported or are being tried as experiments by the mother country, and not on objective, actual conditions in the region's countries.

The organization of planning under these conditions is only a timid and formal academic exercise that does not begin to touch the ruling neocolonial foundations; for planning is something more than a method of economic management. It is the form of organization and management of production and distribution among the people. Thus, any effort to implement it in a nonsocialist company would be limited.

The period established in these plans--from the beginning, perhaps somewhat prematurely, without any previous experience or statistical base--reached the heights of medium-term and on occasions reached long-term, as occurred with the first development plan for Jamaica, which covered 10 years (1947 to 1957), that for Surinam, the first draft plan for Barbados, and others.

The most commonly accepted one, though, was the five-year plan, corresponding to the presidential term of the government in office.

Content

The content of these plans was limited entirely to overall problems of the economy.

The chief planning indicators mentioned were the formation of the Gross National Product (GNP), public sector expenses, especially those devoted to infrastructure, such as transport, communications, water, electricity, sewage, housing and others. Here, expenditures for education, health and housing ranged between 25 and 40 percent of the total.

At the same time, an important element of the plan was to specify the measures that would tend to encourage foreign and domestic investment in the private sector of the economy.

Thus, the plan concentrated primarily on the management of the public sector. Its approach is, moreover, clearly sectorial, and there is a gap between overall planning and local needs. Totally lacking is a regional plan or one for urban development. There are no mechanisms for addressing the citizen's local needs along with the nation's needs and possibilities.

The plan reflects the beliefs and the ideas about development of the party in power; and thus the new plan's goals undergo a 180-degree re-direction under a new administration.

In short, the true needs of the Caribbean people are given little thought and no real attention, and the people have no role in the drawing up and implementation of the economic-development plans.

Limitations and Problems

Planning in the region still suffers from major weaknesses with respect to its conception, preparation, implementation and subsequent control.

According to experts in Caribbean planning, one of the principal limitations lies in the little interest shown thus far by the overwhelming majority of the region's governments-for-a-while in carrying out real, deep changes in the rotten, neocolonialist political, economic and social structures still existing in the region.

The elimination of this obstacle is the basic objective condition for the creation of planning processes designed to benefit the Caribbean peoples. This was the opinion expressed by the experts on Caribbean planning at their first meeting in Havana when in one of their recommendations they said:

"We must stress the need to carry out the necessary changes in the economic-social structures of the region's countries that will make it possible to institute beneficial planning processes."

It is also necessary to achieve, in the subjective sphere, the political will and awareness of the significance and importance of planning as a guiding, supporting tool for an independent economic-social development. There must be agreement that with the help of the old colonial tools or

the new neocolonialist tools, it is not possible to emerge from the age-old backwardness in which the economies of the Antillean countries are sunk.

The disillusionment and disenchantment with long-term planning that predominates in the region is nothing more than the expression of a lack of confidence in many governments, which do not focus their nation's energy on effecting real changes in the existing capitalistic and dependent productive relationships. However, such countries as Jamaica, Guyana and Grenada are now entering a different path, adopting a policy of attention to development and national liberation.

It is a paradox that while even the major capitalist economies are trying to mitigate their cycles of economic crisis by means of "planning" palliatives, many Caribbean governments are publicly declaring that their premature efforts to plan economic development have failed.

With the exception of Cuba, the Caribbean socialist country, and, according to different economists in the region, "Guyana and perhaps Jamaica, the commitment to overall, formal national planning has weakened."[2]

The problems that we will briefly set forth below have not been solved, and in most instances they are not even fully understood by officials in the region.

These problems are so extensive that Dr. Trevor Farrell, economist at the University of the West Indies in Trinidad-Tobago has said, "It appears that the problems of development planning in these countries do not in fact suggest that planning has failed but rather that it has never been attempted."[3]

In short, along with the problems cited previously, the principal limitations on the development of effective planning in the region stem from the following factors:

1. Inadequate authority and independence of planning units resulting from the persistence of decayed administrative structures in the government.

2. The lack of a suitable mechanism for supervising the public and private sectors.

3. The plan has no legal force.

4. There is no clear, concrete definition of the strategies of economic and social development at the national level.

5. The absolute indifference to bringing about broad public participation in discussions, approval, implementation and monitoring of the plan.

6. The lack of a coherent, uniform policy for the treatment of foreign capital and for the mobilization of national capital to serve the ends of national development.

7. The absence of qualified people, in terms of both quality and quantity, at the different planning levels.

8. The lack of a continuous, reliable data base.

9. A continuing dependent relationship with the old mother country.

10. The lack of governmental support and enthusiasm regarding planning.

Regional Planning

The Caribbean countries have made innumerable efforts to integrate. They culminated in the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas in July 1973, which created the CARICOM.

The CARICOM is the integration-oriented association of a group of Caribbean countries that banded together with the shared desire to achieve greater, more harmonic economic and social development.

Twelve countries make up this association: eight independent nations; that is, Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago, Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent; the Associated States, affiliated with Great Britain, Antigua and St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, and two other countries that maintain different levels of dependence on the British mother country: Belize and Montserrat.

Article 45 of the annex to the agreement forming this community established a committee of officials in charge of the national planning agencies of the states belonging to the CARICOM. This was done to facilitate the exchange of information among the agencies and interregional cooperation in the sphere of planning. This committee is one of the principal organs of the Caribbean community, and it is subordinate to the Council, which is second in importance after the Conference of Chiefs of State of the region.

Moreover, the treaty establishes other areas of sectorial planning through other organizations for health, education, labor, agriculture and so forth.

The importance of these different bodies in planning and the coordination of plans at a regional level lies in the fact that, as one can see, efforts to plan in the area have primarily taken place within the regional or sectorial framework, and the existing planning agencies have concerned themselves with coordination and technical assistance or advice in the development of this type of sectorial plan.

Efforts at regional planning have entailed providing advice for physical plans, expansion of statistical services, development of hydraulic resources, and multisectorial regional planning. Moreover, projects have been proposed for the development of industrial transportation, agriculture and other fields related with planning in certain sectors. These and other ambitious projects have not had the hoped-for results owing to the general difficult economic situation these countries are experiencing because of worldwide capitalist inflation, as well as internal factors that limit planning possibilities in the region's countries.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Notes on Development Planning in St. Vincent," prepared by Karl John, director of planning, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Development. First Meeting of Planning Experts of the Caribbean Countries, Havana, 25-31 January 1979.

2. "Six Problems of Development Planning in the Small States of the Caribbean," prepared by Trevor Farrell, professor at the University of the West Indies. First Meeting of Planning Experts of the Caribbean Countries.

3. Idem.

9085
CSO: 3010

BRAZILIAN COMMENTATOR ASSESSES SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

PY291717 Sao Paulo Radio Bandeirantes Network in Portuguese 1000 GMT
29 Dec 79 PY

[Commentary by Newton Carlos]

[Text] Something which we already knew has been confirmed: The involvement of the USSR in the new coup d'etat in Afghanistan. The United States protests, and President Carter suspends a vacation in order to discuss the international situation in Washington.

For Latin Americans, Afghanistan is a faraway country whose significance is difficult to establish on short notice. However, all we have to do is to look at a map to understand the interests at stake.

Through Afghanistan, the USSR can reach the coasts of the Indian Ocean and the oilwells of the Middle East: a strategic corridor is at stake.

The successive coup d' etats which have taken place in Afghanistan, although the same Marxist party has remained in power since 1972, can be explained by the fact that Afghanistan is an Islamic and deeply religious country with a pro-Soviet Marxist government. However, Islamic revolution is threatening this government which is currently under open protection of the Soviet troops.

However, this protection is not enough. Based on the tragic experience of the United States in Vietnam, the USSR knows that it is impossible to maintain in power for long an unpopular, excessively repressive government which has already been besieged by an internal rebellion.

The coups d'etat of 1978 and the last one, by which different leaders of the same party gained access to power, are based on the belief that it is necessary to establish a less repressive, more popular regime. However, the police state has already been created in Afghanistan and has a life of its own, independent from the incumbent of the government house. It seems that in Afghanistan the USSR is facing the same problems the United States had in Vietnam.

CSO: 3001

TEXT OF 1979 NATIONAL AMNESTY DECREE

Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese 2 Nov 79 p 5

[Text] Decree No 84,143 of 31 October 1979

Regulating Law No 6,683 of 28 August 1979, which grants amnesty and provides other measures.

Availing himself of the authority granted in Article 81, Section III of the constitution and taking into account the provisions of Article 13 of Law No 6,683 of 28 August 1979, the president of the republic hereby

Decrees:

Regarding amnesty and those amnestied

Article 1. Amnesty is granted to all those who, in the period between 2 September 1961 and 15 August 1979, committed political crimes or were connected with them, election crimes, those whose political rights were suspended, and those who served in the direct and indirect administration, of a foundation connected with the government, those who served in the legislative and judicial branches, military men and union leaders and representatives, who were penalized on the basis of institutional or complementary acts.

Paragraph 1. For purposes of this article, connected crimes are regarded as those of any nature related to political crimes or committed for political reasons.

Paragraph 2. Those convicted of committing crimes of terrorism, holdups, kidnaping and assault are exempted from the benefits of amnesty.

Article 2. Amnesty is granted to the employees of private companies who, for reasons of participation in a strike or any other movement claiming or demanding rights governed by social legislation, were fired or deprived of their positions or union representation.

Article 3. With reference to the violations and penalties pertaining to noncompliance with mandatory military service, amnesty is granted to those who, for political reasons, were in exile or unable to appear at the time of drafting.

Article 4. The benefits of amnesty will be granted to union leaders and representatives penalized for acts referred to in Article 1, or who received disciplinary punishment or incurred absences from service during that period, provided they did not exceed 30 (thirty) days; also to students.

II. Regarding the dependents of those amnestied

Article 5. The dependents of those amnestied are also benefited by the amnesty with reference to the violations dealt with in Article 3.

Article 6. Dependents of a deceased public servant, or one presumed to be dead, in accordance with Paragraph 4 of Article 6 of Law No 6,683 of 28 August 1979, who if alive would have the right to reversion or return to active service, retirement, transfer to reserve status or retirement according to that regulation, may sue for appropriate benefits.

Article 7. The wife of a military man dismissed by an institutional act who requested a discharge from the post he held in order to qualify for receipt of a pension may request his teturn to public service, in compliance with the appropriate provisions of Article 8, becoming subject to the provisions of Article 15 and 17 of this regulation.

Paragraph 1. Upon his return, the payment of the pension will cease automatically.

Paragraph 2. The provisions of this article apply to the wife of the civil servant covered by the provisions of Law No 4,656 of 2 June 1965, and of Decree-Law No 940 of 13 October 1969.

III. Regarding the request for return or reversion

Article 8. The petition for return or reversion to active service, containing the name of the petitioner, the position he held as of the date of the punishment as well as the date of the punishable act will be forwarded:

I. By the military or civil servant of the direct and indirect administration, as well as of a foundation connected with the government, to the respective state ministry;

II. By the civil servant of the chamber of deputies, the federal senate, the legislative assembly or city council, to the respective president;

III. By the civil servant of the judicial branch to the presiding justice of the respective court;

IV. By the state, federal district, territorial or municipal civil servant to the respective governor or mayor;

V. By the union leader or representative to the minister of state for labor.

Paragraph 1. The petition must be received by the appropriate department by 26 December 1979 or risk not being considered except for a recognized reason of "force majeure."

Paragraph 2. The petition may be presented to the military organization or organ of civil administration, connected with the appropriate ministry, closest to the residence of the petitioner or to which he is connected for purposes of drawing a pension, and the respective commander or official must then forward it to the special commission within a period of 5 (five) days or be held accountable.

Paragraph 3. The petitions of civil servants of organs or agencies that have been abolished or transformed must be submitted to the appropriate authority referred to in this article with which the civil servant was connected at the time he was removed.

Paragraph 4. If by virtue of transfer, the organ or agency is subordinated to or connected with another authority, the petition should be forwarded to the latter organization.

Paragraph 5. The public servant who is abroad may present his petition to a consular department or diplomatic representation of Brazil.

Article 9. When the decision on providing the position or employment does not fall within its authority, the authority mentioned in the foregoing article to which the petition has been submitted will prepare the case together with the opinion of the respective commission and forward it to the competent authority for decision.

Only Paragraph. When dealing with a civil servant of an agency of the indirect administration or a function connected with the government, the approval of the request must be preceded by a statement by the respective state minister, governor or mayor.

Article 10. For all purposes of this decree, a petition is considered to be the expression of the wish of the interested party, made in writing, before the appropriate administrative authority to initiate the act of return or reversion.

Article 11. The petitions will be processed and the case prepared by commissions composed of at least three specially designated members:

I. By the respective state minister, when it is a case of a request by a military man, a civil servant of the direct or indirect federal administration, or of a foundation connected with the government;

II. By the respective presidents, if it concerns a request by a civil servant of the chamber of deputies, the federal senate, a legislative assembly or a city council;

III. By the presiding justice of the respective court, if it concerns a civil servant whose appointment falls within the authority of the judicial branch;

V. By the governor of the Federal District or of a territory, or by the mayor if it concerns their respective civil servants.

Paragraph 1. The operation of each commission may be governed by special work rules established when it is formed, taking into account the peculiarities of the corresponding administrative sector.

Paragraph 2. The commission charged with processing and preparing the case of petitions of former members of the military police forces or of the firemen's corps will be presided over by the commander of the service.

Paragraph 3. The commission charged with processing and preparing the case of the petitions of military men will be composed of at least 3 (three) members, and can take depositions as well as requisition the necessary information from the respective units or organs.

Paragraph 4. The commissions will forward the petition to the appropriate authority, duly prepared and processed, with all clarifications regarding the petitioner, existence of the vacancy and interest on the part of the administration.

Article 12. The authority that appoints the commissions may establish subcommissions in the states, territories and the federal district, as well as in the agencies of the indirect administration and foundations for the exclusive purpose of receiving the petitions, preparing the case and forwarding them to the respective commission.

Article 13. The requests for information by the commissions to prepare the cases, because of the legal deadlines that must be met, must receive priority treatment.

IV. Regarding the decision

Article 14. The decision will be made by the authority indicated in Article 8 or by the president of the republic, when it is within his authority to provide the position on the basis of the case duly prepared by the commission, within a period of 180 (one hundred and eighty) days following receipt of the request.

Article 15. The return or reversion to active service will be approved only to the same position or employment, post or grade level which the civil servant or military man held as of the date of his separation.

Only Paragraph. For the purposes of the application of the provisions of this article, the same position or employment is understood as one of equal level of wages or salary, similar title and overall prerogatives belonging to the same classification system.

Article 16. In order to permit an overall evaluation, no decision will be issued before 60 (sixty) days after the date referred to in Paragraph 1 of Article 8.

Article 17. The return or reversion, in any case, will be conditioned on the existence of a vacancy and the interest of the administration.

Paragraph 1. In the case of a military man, the following procedure is followed:

I. In the interest of the administration, it will be required that the petitioner meet the essential requirements of physical aptitude, professional and moral character, taking into account the records prior to his departure from the service, and that he has not reached the age limits or time in active service stipulated in Article 102, Sections I, II, III, IV and V of Law No 5,774 of 23 December 1971;

II. The reversion to active service and placement on the roster will be in accord with the provisions of Paragraph 4 of Article 18 of Law No 5,774 of 23 December 1971;

III. The position of the military man, after reversion, will be in accord with the provisions of current legislation.

Paragraph 2. In the case of civil servants, the following procedure will be followed:

I. After his return, the civil servant will be included in a supplementary roster which will be formed without detriment to the number of vacancies on the permanent roster.

II. In principle, the legal system governing the civil servant will be the same prevailing at the time of his departure, however, he is guaranteed the right of opting for the labor legislation system, if such is the case;

III. When it concerns a civil servant who was on the staff or table of organization of an organ or agency that is now extinct or that has been transformed, the return or retirement will occur at the same position, on the supplementary roster, of the organ or agency that absorbed its activities;

IV. The position of the civil servant whose petition is approved will be governed by the provisions of current legislation, in addition to the provisions of this article;

V. In the event that retirement is granted to those who had been separated as a result of dismissal or discharge, the payment of the pension granted to the beneficiaries of the civil servant will cease and the payment will be calculated in accordance with the rules of this decree.

Paragraph 3. The return or reversion of the civil servant will be subject to proof of the capability of the petitioner through a medical examination, observance of the age limit rule established by law and, if necessary, proof of the level of education required for performance of the position or job.

Paragraph 4. When dealing with a civil servant who held a technical or scientific position in a sector or department, if a vacancy exists, the return or reversion to active service will be determined exclusively by the interest of the administration.

Article 18. Return or reversion to active service will not be permitted if the separation of the civil servant was due to dishonesty.

Article 19. The authority that has the power to provide the position will issue the authorization for the return.

Article 20. The heads of educational establishments at any level, will take action, independently of the petition of the interested parties, to cancel any records pertaining to disciplinary punishment imposed on students during the period to which Article 1 of this decree refers.

V. Regarding civil service retirement, transfer to the reserve or military retirement

Article 21. The public servant who has not petitioned for return or reversion to active service within the period established in Article 8, Paragraph 1, or whose petition has been rejected, will be regarded as having been retired from the civil service, transferred to the reserve, or retired from the military, with the time of his separation from active service being computed for purposes of calculating his inactive status or retirement benefits.

Paragraph 1. The time of separation from active service to which the present article refers will be considered:

I. For those who did not petition, as the period between the date of the act that resulted in the separation of the active public servant and 26 December 1979;

II. For those whose request was rejected, the period between the date of the act that resulted in separation and the issuance of the decision;

Paragraph 2. If the benefits are less than the amount received as a pension by the family of the public servant, he will be guaranteed payment of the difference as individual benefits.

Paragraph 3. Counting the time of separation is not applicable to those amnestied who were already on inactive status at the time they were punished by any of the sanctions listed in Article 1. Such amnestied persons return to the inactive status in which they were before the punishment.

Paragraph 4. The restriction of Paragraph 3 is not applicable to the military men belonging to the military teaching profession.

Article 22. For the civil servant or military man who returns or reverts to active status, the time of separation from service will be counted for purposes of civil service retirement, transfer to the reserve or military retirement.

VI. Regarding the final provisions

Article 23. Law No 6,683 of 28 August 1979, does not generate any rights--other than those stipulated in it--including those pertaining to wages, pay, salaries, benefits, restitutions, back-pay, reimbursement, promotions or indemnities.

Article 24. The appropriate department will supply the amnestied persons with documents confirming, for all purposes, the regularization of their obligations pertaining to military service.

Article 25. At the petition of the interested parties, the withdrawal of medals and decorations or the right to use them will be reexamined by the appropriate organs or authorities.

Article 26. The supplementary roster referred to in Paragraph 2 of Article 17 will be abolished, for each grade, as the public servants are retired or discharged from their positions.

Article 27. This decree will go into effect on the date of its publication, revoking any contrary provisions.

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COLUMNIST ANALYZES IMPLICATIONS OF POLITICAL REFORM

S- Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 21 Oct 79 p 2

[Article by Fernando Pedreira: "The Government Plan"]

[Text] Of all the measures that the government is prepared to adopt in the framework of its political-party reform, the one that appears to be the most effective and straightforward is the planned cancelation of next year's municipal elections. As a matter of fact, if the government's primary purpose is to keep its men in the saddle and avoid defeats at the polls, then there is no doubt that the best and safest way to do this is to suspend popular elections as much as possible.

The other reform measures tailored in the presidential palace tailor shop are in fact unreliable patches that will not withstand the force of time and at once reveal what the tailor's intentions involve. However, one cannot say that that intention is that deceitful. On the contrary, the government's political plan, as it is explained by its principal architects, seems to be reasonable in its major outlines, and even sensible. Perhaps, it would be appropriate to unfold it in an orderly fashion, point by point:

1. The government starts from the assumption that it will not be possible or advisable to dispense with the 1982 elections that will renew the national congress and select new state governors by direct election. Discounting the possibility of some great unforeseen catastrophe, those elections must constitute an indispensable stage in the preparation of the framework that will determine the presidential succession of 1986. Since it can no longer be done by the revolutionary route, that is, by simple military imposition, the selection of Figueiredo's successor will have to be supported by political alliances which the government still needs to build (if it wants to guarantee its victory) because it is very likely that the National Renewal Alliance (ARENA) by itself will not be able to do the job.

2. The 1982 elections are going to define not only the composition of the congress (the possibility of constitutional reform) in the second half

of the Figueiredo administration, but also the composition of the electoral college, and it is known that the government is still thinking in terms of indirect presidential elections in 1985. In addition, the 1982 election is going to (or not going to) sanction the parties and is going to create new, important political poles, with the direct election of governors for states such as Sao Paulo, Minas, Rio Grande, and Pernambuco. As of January 1983, it will be difficult in major political decisions not to take into account the specific weight that theose governors may acquire at the head of their states.

3. In those decisive 1982 elections, the presidential palace planners know that they must count on a certain number of bitter results. All official strategy is being mounted for the (respectable) purpose of absorbing and reducing those results, so difficult to avoid. In addition to the problems of inflation, strikes, poverty in the outskirts of the large urban centers, and crime in the streets, the opposition fosters the feeling (still very keen in wide sectors of the electorate) that we are living under an imposed government. That feeling is generalized but it is especially strong in the places where the revolution was led to more directly oppose the voice of public opinion and the desire of the voters, as occurred in Sao Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul. In the face of those weighty factors, the popularity of General Figueiredo is still a superficial remedy from which one should not expect miracles, even if Minister Delfim Neto achieves major financial results in the next 2 years.

4. The absorption of the bitter results of the 1982 elections by the government can be done in different ways. Of those ways, the most obvious and crudest is purely and simply adherence by the victors. In 1965 (one may recall) under Marshal Castello, the opposition elected the governors of Guanabara and Minas, a fact that provoked a military rebellion, the issuance of Institutional Act No 2 and the dissolution of the old parties. After the alarm had passed, however, it was then found that the two governors were excellent men, dedicated public servants and loyal to the marshal and the prevailing military system. Therefore, everybody gained; the people, who elected the governors they wanted; and the system, which availed itself of governors cloaked with popular support.

There is nothing to prevent similar circumstances from occurring in the near future. Pedro Simon of Rio Grande do Sul, Franco Montoura and Orestes Quercia of Sao Paulo, Miro Teixeira of Rio, and Tancredo Neves and Renato Azeredo of Minas are all upright and trustworthy men who are certainly further ideologically from the Pernambucan Arraes than from Minister Petronio.

5. Pure and simple adherence, however, is a crude course which should not (and need not) be followed now, at least in the majority of cases. As a matter of fact, only in Rio Grande do Sul and in Rio de Janeiro does the situation appear to be solidly and firmly defined in favor of an opposition candidate. In the other states, there are no absolute forces and

everything is going to depend on the alliances and arrangements it will be possible to form between the various contenders.

In Minas, for example, there are Deputy Magalhaes Pinto's forces, whose candidate is Jose Aparecido de Oliveira; there is the group of Vice President and former Governor Aureliano Chaves; there are Renato Azeredo's and Tancredo Neves' Social Democratic Party people, and there are still others. In Sao Paulo, Senator Montoro is a strong candidate who already has the green light from the regime but who needs to cover his left flank very well or risk seeing one or two candidates arising there capable of taking precious votes away from him and leading him to defeat. In Pernambuco, where the left does not win alone, the presence of Arraes tends to polarize forces and to isolate its supporters, leaving a segment between them and the governor that can include Thales Ramalho, Cid Sampaio, perhaps even Marcos Freire, among others.

The government's intentions, according to its planners, is not to try to impose names but on the contrary to participate in that game of alliances and arrangements, seeking to derive everything possible from it. Not only the state governments will be at stake but also the seats of senators and deputies.

6. Until 1982, the Figueiredo government will try to govern with its expanded ARENA [Arenao] as cohesive and disciplined as possible. By 1982, however, the intention of the presidential palace is to sustain itself with a coalition of political parties and forces with a view to the 1985 presidential succession. One of the guidelines for the formation of that government coalition will naturally be the election results obtained by the various groups. But the simple announcement of that prospective alliance is enough to show that the 1982 elections themselves will already be contended on the basis of agreements and understandings (or lack of them) between the government, on the one side, and the various parties and their candidates, on the other.

7. The great advantage of the government in those preelection negotiations (in addition to its great bargaining power) is the fact that it will be a single entity negotiating with various rivals in each state. The disadvantage will be the strong opposition feeling of the electorate in so many places that can make any great understanding impossible or ineffective. As for the new parties, other than perhaps the one that may result from the union of the "authentics," one should not expect any great rigidity of principles or internal cohesion from any of them capable of impairing their malleability. General Figueiredo (not to mention Governor Maulf) not only has his hand out but his arms open. "Let the little children come onto me."

Therefore, the political process is open and, despite the casuistic particulars of its reforms, the government has announced its readiness to accept new partners in its game plan. What remains to be seen is what the parties are going to offer their voters and how the people will react if they are really allowed to vote now in 1980, again in 1982 and later in 1985. Good or bad, it is an exciting prospect of which we were deprived for so many years: For us, ourselves, to select those who will govern us. It is hard to believe.

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GOVERNMENT CONCERNED BY ARENA, MDB SUSPICION OF REFORMS

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 25 Oct 79 p 5

[Text] Brasilia/Porto Allegre--Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) congressional members and leaders revealed yesterday that a group of National Renewal Alliance (ARENA) dissidents was prepared to support the MDB amendment against the abolition of the present parties as long as they are certain that the reform plan, with the amendment, will insure the adoption of a multiparty system without the rigidity of the original proposal. This support is beginning to concern the government leadership, which fears that it is not in a position to get approval of the plan and may resort to the lapse of time device.

That concern was manifested in a more acute way yesterday by Deputy Nelson Marchezan, who, alerted to the state of mind of his bloc in the chamber, addressed an appeal to ARENA Chairman Jose Sarney, to intervene with the ARENA congressmen not to let the plan pass without a vote, thus becoming mandatory.

ARENA support is being sought by various opposition leaders, who have been holding still informal contacts with the coordinators of the ARENA independent group, among them Roberto Santos, Magalhaes Pinto and Caio Pompeu de Toledo. In the meantime, the major difficulty pertains to the abolition of the parties. Opposition leaders and coordinators do not want to forego revocation of Article 2 of the plan, which provides for the abolition of ARENA and the MDB. In the meantime, the dissidents, who desire the support of the MDB to broaden the plan and reduce the requirements for the introduction of a multiparty system, have not yet pledged to support the opposition amendment revoking the abolition provision.

While Deputy Roberto Freire (Pernambuco) observes that that agreement may be reached, the deputy leader of the party in the chamber, Deputy Marcelo Linhares (Ceara) believes that the climate is not yet right for that "because the MDB will not give up its struggle against abolition."

A suggestion for an MDB substitute is being fought by Senator Paulo Brossard, party leader in the senate. In his opinion, "The plan is no good, there is

no room for a substitute. It is a plan that has the primary object of eliminating the MDB and Mexicanizing the country. If the plan were approved now, as is, the government would form its party because it has the material and human resources capable of forming parties. We know what type of parties. But that it would do so, I have no doubt.

With regard to the labor bloc, although not showing great enthusiasm, the Rio Grande do Sul Deputy Getulio Dias has said that supporters of the future Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) will vote against the abolition of the MDB but does not forego the plan to seek to reduce the requirements of the plan for the organization of new parties. According to one of the opposition leaders, "The PTB has already decided to vote against abolition. It may do so grudgingly but it will vote."

Seeking to organize a party with a popular power base, possibly allied with the Labor Party (PT), former Labor Minister Almino Afonso has had contacts with representatives of the "authentic" and "popular" groups. Last night he met with Senator Marcos Freire and Deputy Fernando Lyra, both from Pernambuco. In the afternoon, Almino participated in an informal meeting with members of the popular group of the office of Deputy Francisco Pinto (Bahia).

On the other hand, Deputy Leader Airton Soares of Sao Paulo explained that the proposition of a workers party or popular party "cannot be considered divisive." In his opinion, everyone is interested in the survival of the MDB "but without closing one's eyes to the new political situation." He declared that "as long as the political conditions prevail, the group wants to create its own party linked to the workers. Anyone who believes that the movement is infantile and juvenile shows that he does not know politics."

The reference to the infantile-juvenile movement made by Airton Soares was in response to the observation of Deputy Audalio Dantas, also of Sao Paulo, according to whom the activities with a view to organizing the Popular Party (PP) or the PT "at this difficult time, when the government wants to put an end to the opposition, can only be of infantile-juvenile inspiration." And he concluded: "We are in favor of a multiparty system; those who are against the multiparty system are the ones who live under the illusion that it is possible to organize parties today in Brazil."

Disunity Revealed in the Chamber

Rebelling against the policy of the leader, 49 ARENA deputies voted in Brasilia yesterday for the complete autonomy of the Legislative Branch, reestablished in a constitutional amendment presented by Deputy Epitacio Cafeteira (MDB-Maranhao), which failed to be approved because of a lack of quorum, lacking only three votes to obtain an absolute majority.

Going against the opinion of ARENA, the 49 deputies voted in favor of the proposal and 29 against. The MDB contributed 159 votes but the absence

of 29 members of the bloc at voting time led several of them to protest, including leaving the chamber. As a result, the minimum quorum of 211 votes was not achieved.

Deputy Epitacio Cafeteira confessed later that he was "bitter and could not forgive" some of the MDB parliamentarians, such as Israel Dias Novais (MDB-Sao Paulo), who, even though hearing the vote call, did not show up in the chamber.

Cafe revealed, in the meantime, that the president of the chamber, Flavio Marcilio, had requested his full proposal for examination by the committee made up of representatives of the chamber and the senate, which is studying the establishment of the prerogatives of congress.

In voting on the amendment, the "bionic" [appointed] senator, Aderbal Jurema (ARENA-Pernambuco), author of the opinion, defended the inadvisability of giving the legislature complete autonomy, saying that this branch could not "be a screen to cover any aggression to national security," provoking a quick response from the deputy leader of the MDB, Marcondes Gadelha, who declared that he was expressing his "disdain" for congress, with his "senatorial position and his inflexibility.

Loans

Only the Legislative Branch could authorize the federal government to grant a financial loan, endorsement, or carry out credit operations of any kind on behalf of private industry, according to a constitutional amendment presented yesterday by Deputy Helio Duque.

In his justification, the deputy declared that his proposal is aimed at "preventing new outrages such as those of the Lutfall and Atalla economic groups, of the check without funds of the Economic Bank, the Intercontinental Investment Bank, the Lume Grupo, and so many others who always had a continual source of financial help in the public funds of the federal government."

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MDB PRESIDENT SEEN PRESSURED BY LEFT WING OF COALITION

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 8 Nov 79 p 3

[Text] Rio--The nonalined, who after Sunday's convention are certain of assuming the command of what may remain of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) although they may continue to declare their disposition to fight against the abolition of the present parties, already think that the government's plan is going to end up strengthening the future PMDB--or PDB--into which the federation of the opposition forces plans to transform itself.

Since September, the nonalined have been pressuring Deputy Ulysses Guimaraes to adopt as the party program one presenting the MDB as "an alliance of the liberals with the democratic left in the fight against authoritarianism." But Ulysses, who has always been afraid of the leftist wing of the MDB and for that reason courted the more moderate wing as a means of not losing control of the party, refused to assume the paternity of the document although the majority of the bloc of senators had already done so.

With the proximity of the convention, and because of the need to isolate the moderates and defeat Senator Tancredo Neves, the alliance between liberals and leftists finally took place. Despite the reelection of Tancredo Neves and Thales Ramalho, that made possible a quiet control of the party executive by those who propose the formation of a future party free of the most pronounced administration-"tagalongs," such as the Chaguistas in Rio and the Aluizistas in Rio Grande do Norte.

According to the nonalined, the government is certain that the "authentics, with their radicalism, would end up pushing the non-leftist majority out of the MDB. In the meantime, the great ability of the man chosen to form an independent party--Tancredo Neves--ended up by strengthening the precarious union of the MDB. Tancredo, by not defining himself and not saying what he really intended to do--unlike Brizola, for example, who always announced his disposition to recreate the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB)--ended up by pushing the moderates in the direction of the growing faction of the nonalined.

And with that, the nonalined ended up seeing their position prevail, namely, that it was better to have a smaller MDB than the present one, and, therefore, more consistent because the future PDB, or PMDB, would be formed without the, for them, constraining presence of Chaguistas, Malufistas or Aluizistas.

For that reason, despite the already certain abolition of the parties, the atmosphere is one of optimism and hope--certainly, even quite exaggerated--for the majority of the MDB, where it is already said that "the alternative party or the party of the reliable opposition has died aborning."

The nonalined believe today that the government plan--which they have no doubt will "be quite improved by congress"--will end up maintaining the present two-party system, perhaps only with a small and still uncertain space for Brizola's PTB. The dissidents of the two sides--the independents in ARENA and the administration-"tagalongs" in the MDB--will be the ones who will be left without a party label.

According to a spokesman of the nonalined, Tancredo Neves will have the alternative of remaining--and quite eroded--in the future party of the opposition, or follow the steps already announced by Thales Ramalho and join Brizola's PTB, because political radicalism will continue and whoever will not be in the expanded ARENA will only survive in a real opposition party because there will not be any place and votes for any attempt at the formation of a not yet explained reliable opposition.

In the meantime, in one of those cases so characteristic of Brazilian politics, the nonalined who today believe themselves to be capable of controlling the "infantilism" of some more radical and irresponsible "authentics," actually fear the pragmatism of the old Communist Party.

The reason being that the communists, insignificant in numbers but with great mobilizing power, continue to support the proposition of a broad front too much for the taste of the nonalined, who believe that this is not the time to fail to take advantage of the excellent pretext the government has given them as a gift to rid themselves of the Chaguistas and administration-"tagalongs."

And that is why some are working to reactivate the very strange alliance of the "expanded party" with Chagas Freitas--which already operated in the 1978 elections--as is already noted in the courting of the left by the principal Chaguista spokesman, Deputy Miro Teixeira.

Cesar Cals

In recent days, the newspapers have published a number of charges against the minister of mines and energy, ranging from the attempt to form a pool for the distribution of advertising funds to the employment of friends, relatives and election bosses.

The report should not be surprising because among his first actions as minister were the appointment of his son as his office chief in Rio, the promotion of his friend from transport chief to technical director of the Light Company and the creation of a special planning board in Furnas for another brother. In addition, at the time he was appointed to the ministry, it was widely reported that Cesar Cals was a personal friend of the president of the republic.

Those are common events in countries where the election of aides is many times made more on the basis of friendship and relationship than on the basis of the competence of those appointed.

Tancredo and Thales

A nonalined MDB man, still opposed to retaining Tancredo Neves and Thales Ramalho in the party executive--the group had already organized a slate without the two, to fight and even win at the convention--recalled an old story.

"A long time ago, an insurance company launched a wide publicity campaign that said: "We don't discuss; we pay." Its competitors protested, considering the ad unethical because it suggested to the public that the other insurance companies did not honor their commitments.

"For that reason, the insurance companies themselves decided to appoint an ethics committee to study the matter. And they selected to head that committee precisely a director of the firm that was being accused. And the work of the committee did not lead to anything."

According to that nonalined MDB man, the story is being repeated now by keeping in the MDB executive two of the members of the group that wants to put an end to the party.

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MAKEUP OF NEW MDB NATIONAL DIRECTORATE DESCRIBED

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 6 Nov 79 p 5

[Text] Brasilia--In the Chamber of Deputies Sunday, the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) held its seventh and last national convention, in the event that the abolition of the present parties called for in the party reform plan is confirmed. The new national directorate of the opposition party was elected by a vote of 436 for, 11 blank and 6 void. Chairman Ulysses Guimaraes was retained in his position but Senator Tancredo Neves was replaced as vice chairman by another senator, Teotonio Vilela; Deputy Thales Ramalho was reelected secretary general.

Voting was opened by Deputy Ulysses Guimaraes at around 0900 hours and voting was closed at 1700 hours. Votes were then counted and the various motions against the abolition of the MDB were approved. Finally, the 71 members elected to form the national directorate met and elected the national executive committee, composed of an equal number of "authentics," moderates and nonalined.

The composition of the executive is as follows:

Chairman: Deputy Ulysses Guimaraes (Sao Paulo); first vice chairman: Senator Teotonio Vilela (Alagoas), nonalined; second vice chairman: former Deputy Alencar Furtado (Parana), authentic; third vice chairman: Senator Tancredo Neves (Minas Gerais), moderate; secretary general: Deputy Thales Ramalho (Pernambuco), moderate; first secretary: former Deputy Jarbas Vasconcellos (Pernambuco), authentic; second secretary: Senator Itamar Franco (Minas Gerais), nonalined; first treasurer: Senator Mauro Benevides (Ceara), moderate nonalined; second treasurer: Deputy Marcondes Gadelha (Paraiba), authentic; and voting members: Senator Franco Montoro (Sao Paulo), nonalined; Deputy Walber Guimaraes (Paraiba), moderate; Deputy Joao Guilberto (Rio Grande do Sul), authentic; and Senator Lazaro Barbosa (Goias), moderate.

The session was closed at 2030 with speeches by chairman Ulysses Guimaraes and leaders Feitas Nobre and Paulo Brossard.

Comments

"They can attack a party label and a party but never the presence of the people in the political process," declared Mario Covas, the regional chairman of the MDB in Sao Paulo, speaking from the gallery of the congress after a 1-year absence from the chamber following his ouster. For his part, former MDB leader, Deputy Alencar Furtado, who had also been ousted, recalled the characteristic of popular unity assumed by the MDB, and condemned the abolition of the party and the reform plan.

In his closing speech, Deputy Ulysses Guimaraes stressed that "the seventh national convention was not the tomb of the MDB. By its enthusiasm and attendance, especially in terms of students, workers and liberal professionals, it was the symbol of the popular forces and intelligentsia that will bury the authoritarian regime." Shortly before that, when he announced the results of the election to the national directorate, Ulysses declared that he had already communicated to the presidents of the chamber and the senate, Flavio Marcilio and Luiz Vianna, respectively, "the supreme humiliation of the majority if it should leave the chamber and allow the reform to be approved by lapse of time." He alleged that it will thus be abetting the government's strategem to abolish the MDB.

"The authoritarian regime, which has already tried to contain and defeat the party through fear, through ousters and through election legislation that, in fact, is the ARENA statute--linked vote, law of ineligibilities, sub-slates, the Falcao Law--has now decided to say 'no' to the opposition party itself, with the fascist purpose of exterminating it," concluded Ulysses.

In the opinion of Senator Paulo Brossard, the convention was not a fancy funeral for the MDB but rather "the most vibrant and ardent of all the conventions the party has held, a civic festival of a party that is not about to die but that is being reborn strong and renewed." Brossard pointed out that the "government's party reform plan is a real holdup, which seeks to abolish the MDB in order to dispose of its assets. It is a plan that kills to rob." For his part, Deputy Feitas Nobre, opposition leader in the Chamber of Deputies said that "the party reform is a bait, a gyp, another repugnant and unconstitutional foul-smelling package prepared to crush the organized opposition and allow easy maneuvering room for the antidemocratic ruses that are being concocted."

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MDB NATIONAL LEADERSHIP POLLED ON FUTURE OF COALITION

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 6 Nov 79 p 5

[Text] What will happen to the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) after abolition and after what happened at Sunday's national convention? That question from opposition parliamentarians of the most diverse tendencies is still without an objective answer. "There is a lot of water flowing and a lot of tree trunks in the floodwaters," commented nonalined Senator Teotonio Vilela, the new first vice chairman of the MDB.

The Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) forces, one of the many subgroups of the MDB, do not seem to be discouraged or pessimistic. Deputies Jose Costa, Magnus Guimaraes, Getulio Dias and others, all engaged in organizing Brizola's PTB, however, cannot avoid concern regarding the new problem: The possible desertion of Rio Grande do Sul Senator Pedro Simon. Before the report that Senator Simon had declared himself for the Brazilian Democratic Party (PDB), rejecting the PTB, the laborites had already admitted difficulties regarding the support of Franco Montoro, Jose Richa, Roberto Saturnino and others. Even so, the PTB forces still do not believe that Pedro Simon has made his decision.

For their part, the moderates, led by Tancredo Neves and Thales Ramalho, do not appear excited by Sunday's convention, much less skeptical with regard to the division in the MDB. If a "reliable" opposition party is not organized, the moderates continue to concede that they will join the PTB.

"We consider it easier and more possible to work with Brizola than with Miguel Arraes and his 'authentics,'" Ceara Deputy Figueiredo Correa, one of the coordinators of the moderate group and one of those closest to Senator Tancredo Neves, declared yesterday. Deputies Walber Guimaraes (Parana) and Henrique Alves (Rio Grande do Norte) agreed with his observation.

The moderates did not examine the party situation yesterday because of the absence of Senator Tancredo Neves in Brasilia. "He is scheduled to return to this capital tomorrow and his followers plan to force him to declare himself. There is no possibility of working with the 'authentics' in the

new party. They do not lose any opportunity to fight against us," said Figueiredo Correa, lamenting the boos and insults of the "conventionals" and "populars" aimed at the moderates and the Chaguistas at the convention. In his opinion, "the episode sealed the division in the MDB."

The moderates do not fail to recall that in 1977, the "authentics" did not hesitate to seek the support of the group for the candidacy of Alencar Furtado to the leadership, which was victorious, including many Chaguista votes. "The Chaguistas," they say, "never ceased to vote with the leadership in the plenum."

Like Henrique Alves, Carlos Cotta, Walber Guimaraes and others, Figueiredo Correa yesterday rejected the possibility of the moderates joining the Brazilian Democratic Party advocated by the nonalined and "authentics." If they do not organize the nonradical opposition party headed by Tancredo Neves, the majority of the moderate group may opt for Brizola's PTB.

The Pedro Simon episode aside, the nonalined appear to be optimistic in the conviction that the plans of Ministers Petronio Portella and Golbery do Couto e Silva to "implode" the MDB will fail. Yesterday, for example, national first vice chairman Teotonio Vilela and the chairman of the regional directorate of Sao Paulo, Mario Covas, set their positions: Both are convinced that a strong opposition party including liberals and politicians of the left--the nonalined with the (historic) "authentics" can be organized.

The neo-"authentics --divided into the "popular" and Labor Party (PT) supporter groups--however, do not appear as confident. Yesterday a meeting of the supporters of the PT was held in a country house near Brasilia to assess the political-party situation and the future of the party. Francisco Pinto, Airton Soares, Cristina Tavares, Edgard Amorim, Elquisson Soares and Freitas Diniz, among others, organized the meeting. It was revealed that Almino Afonso and Fernando Henrique Cardoso were invited. The "popular" group acknowledges that in the short term it would not be feasible to organize the Popular Party (PP), but that they should continue their efforts to achieve that goal in the medium term, possibly after the 1982 elections. Until that time, the PP will support the replacement for the MDB.

In the opinion of the vice leader of the MDB in the senate, Gilvan Rocha (Sergipe), the new MDB should not include the radical left "nor the Chico Pintos and Arraes of life." However, Teotonio Vilela believes that the PDB should not admit only the Malufistas, Chaguistas and administration-"tagalongs." The Alagoas senator made it a point to make clear that one cannot confuse moderates with administration-"tagalongs," Malufistas and Chaguistas. He named as moderates who could belong to the PDB, Ceara Senator Mauro Benevides and Minas Deputy Carlos Cotta, "among so many other worthy and respectable people."

Beside him, the chairman of the Sao Paulo MDB, Mario Covas, concurred, relating that the dispute regarding the regional directorate in Sao Paulo

facilitated separation and that the new opposition party in the state will emerge purged and recycled.

Covas and Vilela, by the way, no longer have any doubt that several of the parliamentarians cited as supporters of Brizola's PTB will actually come into the "new MDB." Both believe that Rio Grande do Sul Senator Pedro Simon, for example, has already decided in favor of the PDB, rejecting the PTB plan. But they believe that the former Rio Grande do Sul governor will be in a position to organize his own party. "There will be the expanded National Renewal Alliance (ARENA) [the Arenao], the PDB and the PTB," said Teotonio Vilela. Asked about what would happen to the Malufistas, Chaguistas and administration-"tagalongs," the National first vice chairman of the MDB did not hesitate: "They can only go to the expanded ARENA.

From the comments heard yesterday, Pedro Simon would have a prominent place in the PDB--chairman or secretary general. In the meantime, the Rio Grande do Sul senator avoided broaching the problem of his joining the PDB or his support for the PTB. He postponed from yesterday to today his meeting with the press to talk about the subject. But the parliamentarians who talked to Simon, such as Mario Covas and Teotonio Vilela, for example, like the Rio Grande do Sul deputies Rosa Flores, Odacir Klein and Joao Gilberto have no doubts: The senator has rejected Brizola's PTB and is going to work for the successor to the MDB.

Brizola was informed about the report involving Pedro Simon and was incredulous about the senator's decision. Jose Costa, Magnus Guimaraes and Getulio Dias related that one of the participants at Pedro Simon's meeting with the Rio Grande do Sul conventionals, Deputy Lidovino Fanton did not hear the senator make a definite decision. In addition to Pedro Simon, the PTB forces continue to report as "probable" supporters of the PTB, Senators Franco Montoro, Jose Richa and Roberto Saturnino, in addition to Leite Chaves, Agenor Maria, Amaral Peixoto, Nelson Carneiro and Adalberto Sena, all regarded as certain.

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LIMITS OF LIBERALIZATION PROGRAMS RECOGNIZED

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 30 Oct 79 p 3

[Text] Brasilia--Although not admitted and even denied publicly by its spokesmen, there is concern in the government over a growing discontent in military circles over the return of formerly ousted personnel, the statements of communist leaders, and the possibility, even though remote, of situations flowing from the party reform capable of facilitating the action of the so-called left. Add to that picture, the dramatic component of the economic-financial crisis and one has the recipe for a dish capable of giving the political opening a case of indigestion. It is known that last week, speaking to at least two National Renewal Alliance (ARENA) leaders, from that perspective, Chairman Joao Figueiredo criticized opposition actions in recent events, revealing that many times he even feels like giving it all up and "let the military ministers take over and settle accounts with them." There was no other reason for the irritation expressed by Justice Minister Petronio Portella, who believes that "we are sitting in the crater of a volcano."

Except for minority and small radical sectors, we do not perceive any military sentiment against the opening and the gradual democratization underway. At least directly. Though apocryphal manifestos continue to circulate in the corridors of congress, as they did yesterday, along the line of industrialized anticommunism, the truth is that most general military thinking, as expressed by its leaders, not only accepts but even supports and sustains the country's return to a state of law, provided that...provided that the structures of the current regime are not shaken. The problem is that by training the military have become accustomed to analyzing the juncture through the lens of security, and for them, that cannot be placed in jeopardy. If the communists organize and operate in the light of day, taking advantage of the opposition feeling still evident among the public despite the popularity of the president, and if inflation and the energy problems continue to worsen, at least the yellow light will light up in the stop light operated by the military establishment. General Joao Figueiredo knows better than anyone else how to detect those variations as well as to transmit them to his political command. In the present case, his strategy is not to interrupt the process of political opening, of not

coming to a crossroads like the one faced by his predecessors since Castello Branco because, if by chance he is forced to choose between his background and his normalizing plans, he will not hesitate to repeat the action of the other general-presidents and be more a general than a president. His interest is to prevent things from reaching a point of no return. As a first phase, he is demanding that ARENA today and the expanded ARENA in a few weeks do not let themselves be surpassed by the opposition, by transitory or permanent dissidents. In a short time, however, perhaps he may decide to activate certain measures to defend the regime; not the emergencies, much less the state of emergency, but perhaps the national security law. On whom or against whom, it is still difficult to determine, but it is not necessary to have much imagination to suppose that such measures will fall upon part of the sectors that, after 15 years of repression and silence, appear not to have learned anything and are trying to start from the point where they were stifled.

Will we repeat the same cycle as ever or will the revolution this time be in a position to absorb the tremors that are beginning to be felt, as long as they do not become earthquakes? It is fair to recognize the difference of situations, because from 1964 until now the hardline held a captive seat in power, when it was not in the majority. To speak about amnesty, direct vote, legitimacy and democratization formerly led to imprisonment, which does not occur now inasmuch as normalization is becoming a reality through the efforts of the authorities themselves. If the process were analyzed from that angle alone, the so-called system could even turn a deaf ear to the stirred up political feeling, the reintegration of its old adversaries or even the handing of shares of power to opposing forces. The equation is complicated, however, when the military, like the rest of the country, perceive that inflation is assuming catastrophic levels or that our external dependence in terms of energy is assuming proportions unprecedented in all of recent history. From that point of view, all change begins to seem dangerous to them.

As always, therefore, though something has changed, the general pattern remains the same; the gun batteries of the system are turned against the politicians. It is allegedly the fault of deputies and senators "who cannot understand the great efforts carried out by the president to lead the nation toward a democratic course." For that reason, to criticize, organize or promote the rejection of the party reform plan sounds to official ears like a sacrilege, but deep down, everything is a smokescreen. Today, like yesterday, the politicians can do very little; their rights have, in fact, been broadened only through "jus sperniandi." When the leader of the government reveals his irritation over the action of some and the inaction of others, merely pro forma, he may convey the impression that the key to the whole process lies in the behavior of the politicians. As a matter of fact, the keystone of the democratic structure that is attempted to be built is very far from Three-Powers Square.

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DEPUTY WARNS OF DANGER OF RIGHT WING COUP

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 24 Oct 79 p 5

[Text] In Brasilia yesterday, Deputy Magnus Guimaraes (MDB-Rio Grande do Sul) alerted political circles to the danger of a "bland rightist coup" for the purpose of impeding party reform in case congress rejects the plan presented by the government. Declaring that politics is "the art of the possible," the deputy said that a coup of that nature would be a retreat and a return to the darkest and most unhappy days of the regime that was established in the country in 1964.

The Brizola-supporting deputy recalled that every time the government has presented reform plans at any level it has always achieved success, even resorting to nondemocratic methods, as for example, the institutional reform, when it recessed congress. The April reforms, according to him, were also established the same way "at the whim of the always discretionary will of the regime, preparing its quorum and dividing the houses of congress in the most brutal and violent affront to the most common democratic principles."

Magnus Guimaraes believes that it is necessary more than ever for political circles to use all of their ability and competence now put to the test with the government party reform plan.

Deputy Jader Barbalho (MDB-Para), in turn, declared that the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) and the Brazilian opposition dismiss the hypocriticial concern of the government about their possible contradictions, denying it any democratic authority to translate their interests. According to Barbalho, the MDB would never impede the establishment of a multiparty system, releasing without public or veiled threats all those who may wish to form other parties.

Chaguista Marcio Macedo (MDB-Rio de Janeiro) in a resounding tone, expressed the conviction that the plan will not be approved, especially in the chamber, where there are no "bionic" parliamentarians, because of the "weaknesses and aberrations" inherent in it. According to him, the government proposal does not create any opening for the multiparty system but concerns itself merely with abolishing the MDB, which over the years, for the "men of the regime," has become a "specter that must disappear."

"The government is playing with the national sentiment," stressed Marcio Macedo. "President Joao Figuiredo sends a reform plan to congress which is really a joke in very poor taste. Let the men in the government not delude themselves that congress is merely the seat of an ornamental branch. They should not underestimate the pride and dignity of the parliamentarians who, in the last analysis, represent the national conscience."

Deputy Hilderico Oliveira (MDB-Bahia) also agrees with the need for congress to reject the government plan. The dissatisfaction it has aroused, in the opinion of the deputy, will unite various National Renewal Alliance (ARENA) parliamentarians to the opposition. "We can even envision the emergence of a political front capable of showing that we are not guinea pigs in a political laboratory subject to the whims of government experiments."

ARENA Deputy Simao Sessim (Rio de Janeiro), in turn, criticized the adoption of the sub-slates, saying that retaining them "would be an anachronism making the government retrogress 40 years, returning to the system before the 1930 revolution when the political parties were all state parties and had municipal subdivisions as determined by the local political leaders.

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GENERAL PIRES WARNS RETURNING EXILES AGAINST REVENGE

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 24 Oct 79 p 6

[Text] In his speech of greeting to the Brazilian Air Force (FAB), commemorating Aviator's Day, Army Minister General Walter Pires declared that "the armed forces are following the example of the president of the republic, seeking to internalize the feeling of amnesty because it will never become a collective desire if it is not firmly established within each one." The minister observed, however, "That does not seem to be the feeling of so many benefited by amnesty, perhaps even of those who least answered for their guilt, who are returning to the country repeating old cliches and watchwords, or declaring that they are going to resume the same activities to which they foolishly led."

Expressing thanks for the greetings of the army minister, who also spoke on behalf of the navy, Air Minister Brigadier Delio Jardim de Mattos said that in today's Brazil "there is no room except for those who add." According to Delio de Mattos, "Those who still try to subtract hopes, dividing the nation and multiplying pessimism, show little talent." He also referred to the "old refrains" that "have only a light trace of nostalgia linking them to reality." "They are old actors," continued the brigadier, "repeating the only script they know, an old, superseded script of great ambitions and small ideas." According to the FAB minister, those "old actors" will be "absorbed by the moment, by the lack of a public, by the very pace of events."

The main ceremony on Aviator's Day was held at the Brasilia Air Base, with the attendance of President Figueiredo and almost all the ministers of state, among them former Health Minister Castro Lima, who received the Medal of Aeronautical Merit. In addition to Castro Lima, the medal was awarded to Finance Minister Karlos Rischbieter, Transport Minister Eliseu Rezende, Education Minister Eduardo Portella, Labor Minister Murillo Macedo, Social Communication Minister Said Farhat, and Social Security Minister Jair Soares.

The ceremony began at 1000 hours after the arrival of President Figueiredo. The ceremony was led off by the reading of the order of the day of the air

minister, followed by the presentation of the Order of Aeronautical Merit and the sashes of the "Grand Cross of the Order" to Brigadier Carrao de Andrade, commanding general of the air; Brigadier Paulo Victor, commanding general of support of the FAB; and Brigadier Abreu Coutinho, commanding general of aeronautics. The presentation of the sashes was made by the president of the republic. The ministers of state were decorated by Foreign Minister Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro.

In Sao Paulo, General Victor Dietriech Leite of the department of research and development, presided over Aviator's Day ceremonies, presenting the Order of Aeronautical Merit to Governor Paulo Malus and the commander of the 2d Army, General Milton Tavares de Souza. On behalf of Minister Delio Jardim de Mattos, General Victor Leite also decorated Brigadier Ismael Abati, director of the Aeronautical Park and General Joaquim Fonseca, assistant at the War College (ESG), in addition to the secretary of transportation, Leon Alexandr and the titular chief of the Department of Public and Social Order (DOPS), Romeu Tuma. Twenty other civilian and military personalities received the decoration for services rendered to the FAB.

During the 35-minute ceremony held in Camp Marte, the order of the day of the air minister was read.

In Rio, Aviator's Day commemorations were marked by the presentation of awards as commanders of the Order of Aeronautical Merit to 80 military men and 19 civilians. Admiral Ernesto Carneiro Ribeiro and Admiral Jose Geraldo Teofilo Labano de Aratanha, General Gentil Marcondes Filho, commander of the 1st Army, Ambassador Geraldo de Heraclito Lima, Air Brigadier Friedrich Wolfgang Derschum and Governor Chagas Freitas, received the medal in the rank of Grand Officer.

In Porto Alegre, commemorations on the occasion of Aviator's Day were held at the Canoas Air Base, of the 5th Air Command with the attendance of Governor Amaral de Souza and high-ranking civilian and military officials of Rio Grande do Sul. During the ceremony, medals of the Order of Aeronautical Merit were presented.

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SUPPORT EXPRESSED FOR PIRES WARNING TO EXILES

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 24 Oct 79 p 6

[Text] "I view the words of Minister Walter Pires with respect to the exiles, who return to Brazil repeating old cliches, with great satisfaction. His warning is constructive, never alarmist. I myself had the opportunity to say the same thing in other words, and I would be honored to endorse what he stated yesterday on the occasion of the ceremony for 'Aviator's Day'."

This was the comment by ARENA [National Renewal Alliance] leader Jarbas Passarinho on the observation made by the Minister of the Army to those benefitting from the amnesty. A different interpretation was made by Deputy Joao Gilberto of the MDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement] from Rio Grande do Sul: "After all, what did the minister want?" he asked. Amnesty implies a pardon, the forgetting of differences there were between the parties in confrontation, but not in the abandoning of convictions. Those who act within the law should have nothing to fear."

As far as the government leader in the Chamber of Deputies, Deputy Nelson Marchezan, is concerned, the warning by Walter Pires was "simply timely because he is one of the authorities responsible for insuring order and security. However, no alarm or fear is justifed on the basis of what he said."

Senator Teotonio Vilela of the MDB believes the statement to be "normal" and said that he does not believe that it will even result in any repercussions.

In the opinion of the Minister of the Communications Media, Said Farhat, the speech by the minister of the army was "particularly appropriate" and "reflected the opinion of the army, the armed forces, the entire government and the great majority of Brazilian society."

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SECOND ARMY CHAPLAIN WARNS COMMUNISTS

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 2 Nov 79 p 5

[Excerpt] "The Cross and the Sword are joined together here in the same feeling of faith and patriotism against the demagogs who want to sell the rotten, damaged and outdated merchandise of an atheist and materialist communism, although under the deceitful appearance of a disguised humanism." This statement was made by Second Army Chaplain Maj Jose Inacio de Melo during the mass at the conclusion of the Pilgrimage to the National Basilica of Nossa Senhora da Aparecida.

According to those attending, the sermon by the chaplain-major was a reply to dom Paulo Evaristo Arns. Participating in the military procession were Gen Milton Tavares de Souza, Second Army commander; Gen Tulio Chagas Nogueira, commander of the Second Military Region; Gen Henrique Beckmann, commander of the Second Army Division, and Gen Leo Etchegoyen, chief of staff of the Second Army.

Arriving at the National Basilica, General Milton waived military honors so as "to enter as a pilgrim," and he joined a procession carrying the statue of Nossa Senhora Conceicao, the patroness of the National Army, which remained on view at the Army Police Chapel in Sao Paulo. The entry of the statue into the Basilica was preceded by the "Song of Exile" performed by three military bands and sung by the military men present, several of them accompanied by their families.

The commander of the Second Army, when praised during the mass by the auxiliary bishop of Aparecida, declared that "the military men who are here hope to receive protection for their anonymous work that guarantees progress with order to the Brazilian people. It cannot be understood how a good citizen can be aloof from the church. May this miraculous saint protect us at this time in which there is talk throughout the country about class struggle and communism. Our salvation rests with God and the Virgin Mary."

At the end of the mass, General Milton declared that the economic situation of the country is serious and "that is why, together, we need faith and patriotism." In his opinion, democratization is arousing passions and creating difficulties, particularly with respect to demands, "although the social situation is well under control because the opening created by the government was duly calculated and weighed in all respects." On the statements by General Serpa, the commander of the Second Army said: "He is responsible for what he says, that is why he holds a high position in the armed forces."

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INFIGHTING FOR PCB LEADERSHIP DESCRIBED

Sao Paulo VEJA in Portuguese 31 Oct 79 p 35

[Text] The first smile by Luis Carlos Prestes, secretary general of the Brazilian Communist Party [PCB], in the collective interview he granted last Tuesday in Rio de Janeiro, was when asked a question by a TASS news agency correspondent: "Comrade Prestes," asked the newsman, "What did you feel during those years you lived in the Soviet Union?" Naturally Prestes tempered the reply with fulsome praise of the country which gave him asylum. But he frowned again when reporters asked him about the split appearing at the summit of the PCB, a subject about which Prestes does not like to speak.

In the interview, Prestes rejected the theory of "A Constituent Assembly with Figueiredo," presented by Jose Sales, at 39-years-of-age the baby of the central committee. He considered the convocation to a meeting of the committee on a day, time and place previously announced and suggested by former deputy Hercules Correa, as "a dangerous mistake." Correa, whose stock of ideas is far from exhausted, a short while ago suggested the replacement of the secretary general by a collegiate body. On Tuesday, he proposed that texts which establish the defense of atheism be expurgated from the party program.

In Writing

This was the matter of an attempt to renew the love affair with the Catholic Church, interrupted by the series of pronouncements by religious leaders opposed to any form of alliance with the PCB. The isolation of his party and the domestic dispute bother the former deputy: "It is hard to face two fights at the same time, one against the regime and the other within the party," declared Correa. A truce seems improbable, particularly because the party can no longer postpone the discussion on the succession to Prestes, who now is 82 years old. It is not a matter of importance for the rest of the country since the PCB is of no major importance in the national political picture.

Until a short time ago, the old chief carried the names of two candidates to succeed him in his vest pocket: that of his daughter Anita Leocadia and that of Jose Sales. This year, in a meeting held in Europe, Anita Leocadia became disgusted with the "rightist tendencies" of the central committee and announced that she intended to resign. "I am accepting requests for resignation," heckled Hercules Correa, who presided over the meeting, "and I ask that they be in writing." With no choice, Anita Leocadia made her withdrawal formal. In June, at a central committee meeting in Prague, Prestes attributed three capital sins to Sales. "careerism, corruption," and surprisingly, "the use of narcotics," and he asked for his expulsion. The communist chiefs rejected the proposal, however, since that time, Salas was no longer considered the virtual successor of the "old man."

In addition to him, Hercules Correa-discredited because of his recent run-ins with Prestes--Giocondo Dias, now in silent retirement in Bahia, and Salomao Malin, who is still in Paris, are also in the race. It is not advisable, however, to consider the secretary general a dead card. Last week,ensconced in the apartment on Rainha Elizabeth Street in Ipanema, rented for 50,000 cruzeiros a month by Architect Oscar Niemeyer, he prepared to show that he still has enough energy to try to name his own successor.

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ARCHBISHOP ADVOCATES LEGALIZATION OF PCB

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 2 Nov 79 p 5

[Excerpt] In Natal, the Archbishop of Paraiba, dom Jose Maria Pires, declared yesterday that he is in favor of the legalization of the Communist Party "since the communists and the party exist."

In contact with the press in Natal after opening the Seventh Brazilian Christian Union Communications Media Congress, the archbishop declared: "The party is there. Legalized or not, it is there, bothering people. Therefore, it is preferrable to have an open, known rival than one which is infiltrated into our parties: there are people who suffered the accusation of belonging to the party and were imprisoned for it. I will fight against it but I am in favor of its legalization."

Dom Jose Maria Pires added that from the point of view of the Church, the greatest problem of the Communist Party is not its atheism "but the fact that it does not respect the rights of the human being, does not respect those who oppose it." According to the archbishop, even a change in the position of the communist party with respect to the church would not force a change in the relationship of the latter with it because "up to now the experiences in countries where that regime has been installed have been negative."

After condemning both capitalism and communism, dom Jose Maria said that "socialism is the solution, since it is the system that foresees the common ownership of the means of production. However, he made one reservation: "Now it is necessary to find a type of socialism other than the Russian and Chinese models." On Eurocommunism he said: "For the time being it is only a beautiful theory because it has not yet assumed power."

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PRESTES SPEAKS ON ROLE OF MILITARY, URGES OPPOSITION UNITY

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 24 Oct 79 p 2

[Text] The secretary general of the extinct Brazilian Communist Party, Luis Carlos Prestes, declared yesterday in an interview granted at the headquarters of the Brazilian Press Association [ABI] that the military must play a "great role" in the struggle for the redemocratization of the country, but for this they need to "abandon that small group of torturers who humiliate Brazil and the traditions of the armed forces."

Questioned by newsmen, Prestes said he does not know "whether in the case of Brazil social changes could be brought about peacefully or through armed struggle and civil war. We do not generally oppose armed struggle except in certain circumstances. At the beginning of 1964 it was an idea which had to be put aside because at that time there was not even the opportunity for a strike. As communists, however, we can demand armed struggle as well as civil war, depending on the circumstances."

The communist leader thanked "all those who fought for amnesty," pointing out the actions of amnesty committees of the Catholic Church or other religious beliefs, the Brazilian Bar Association [OAB], and the ABI. However, he added, the amnesty which allowed his return does not represent a complete victory and he asked that the measure be extended "because there are Brazilians who are still in jails of reaction and others who cannot return to their country." According to Prestes, as a result of the governments installed as of 1964 "there was a growth of the large estate system, an increase in the dependence of Brazil on the foreign oppressor, social and regional differences became worse, and the gap, which today separates the minority of the rich and the great majority which is every day poorer and miserable, widened."

Single Front

After suggesting "the application of socialist science to concrete reality," to resolve the problems of the country, Luis Carlos Prestes said that one of the main points of the political struggle "against the division-provoking maneuvers of the dictatorship" must be the organization and unity of the opposition. He reiterated that he believes the rallying of all opposition around the MDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement] to try to prevent its abolishment though party reform is important.

However, he said that if the opposition party is abolished, the creation of a single opposition front is possible in the new party picture.

"There, the PTB [Brazilian Labor Party], the PT [Workers Party] and other parties, which intend to organize as authentically opposition groups, must remain united in that front to fight against the dictatorship. We appeal to them to unite around a program with that objective."

Luis Carlos Prestes expressed the hope that the next PCB congress on the seventh "will take place with the party already legalized."

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BRIZOLA BELIEVES PTB, PC CAN WORK TOGETHER

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 26 Oct 79 p 2

[Text] The former governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Leonel Brizola, admitted in Sao Paulo yesterday that "since there are specific questions to be defended or discussed, the PTB [Brazilian Labor Party] and the PC [Communist Party] could be together." Brizola made it a point to make it clear that such action by his party with the communists would only be possible with respect to specific questions. "And that does not mean definitive alliances," he added.

That statement by Leonel Brizola was due to a recent statement by Brazilian Communisty Party Secretary General Luiz Carlos Prestes: "Brizola has the right to refuse to have communists in the PTB, however, that does not mean that we are not going to march together, that there is no common ground on which we can act together."

Brizola also said that "the labor party excludes no one, but it cannot accept dual membership. Whoever wants to join the PTB cannot be a member of another party, even if it is clandestine. It is not possible to serve two masters."

As far as he is concerned, the PTB cannot now accept the proposal of the communists for organizing an opposition front around the MDB [Brazilian Democratic Party]: "That proposal is made in the name of causes which have not had much explanation and justification. That is typical of an elitist party which has several cards hidden up its sleeve and had great capacity for maneuvering.

"The PTB was always a party of the left but does not accept hegemony in the left," reiterated Brizola. He also spoke of the behavior of MDB Senator Pedro Simon of Rio Grande do Sul, who may possibly ally himself with Miguel Arraes. The former governor declared that he was not surprised at the behavior of the senator when he signed a document against the abolishment of the MDB. The problem, according to him, is that "the document has other connotations." Even so, Brizola believes in the return of Simon to the PTB. And he does not exclude the hypothesis that he will support him as candidate to the government of Rio Grande do Sul in 1982, if the senator were a member of his party.

With respect to Miguel Arraes, he recalled that he was the first person he invited to talk about a possible union, but as the talks were held, differences increased and they became difficult to overcome. However, he declared, it is not an impossible hypothesis that he will join the PTB." In a report on his visit to Sao Paulo he said that in the various contacts he made, he did not try to convince anyone to join the PTB or support the founding of the party.

Brizola also answered the warnings that there is the possibility that the PTB would be invaded by Maluf supporters, as was stated by some "authentic" senators: "Additions from the left or right, provided they represent acts of conscience, do not worry us. However, we shall be severe with those who were involved in corruption."

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SUPPORT FOR BRIZOLA IN SAO PAULO SEEN WANING

Sao Paulo VEJA in Portuguese 31 Oct 79 p 30

[Text] As a social program, the passing of former governor Leonel Brizola through Sao Paulo was a success. He was received by Sao Paulo intellectuals at the apartment of sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso, by 18 state deputies of the MDB [Brazilian Democratic Party] and he posed embracing metal workers union leader Luis Inacio da Silva, "Lula." As a political beginning, however, the foray was a failure. In his 4 days of pilgrimage, the only glimmer of support he received was from a source he least wanted: the president of the Sao Paulo ARENA [National Renewal Alliance] organization, Claudio Lembo, who promised to read the PTB program and go to Rio de Janeiro next month to discuss it with the labor party members.

"I did not come with the intention of enlisting persons for our plans," said Brizola commenting on the trip, "but to evaluate the new reality of the country and to establish the climate for a dialog." It was not an easy task, since more than once Brizola reminded questioners that it took "an ox not to get mixed up in a brawl and a troop to get out of it." The remark was aimed at the groups who absolutely refuse to accept the PTB: the supporters of the vague Workers Party [PT] and the "authentics" of the MDB.

Without Comment

Wednesday afternoon, wearing the well-known linen suit he wore in exile, Brizola essayed his first endeavor in the Sao Bernardo Metal Workers Union, general headquarters of the PT organizers. There, what was to have been a press interview became an argument between Brizola and Lula. "We want free unions without any links to the government," said Lula, criticizing Brazilian labor legislation inherited from Getulio Vargas. The former governor gave this reply: "Well, thanks to him it was possible to maintain that union headed by you even during the period of dictatorship." As far as Brizola is concerned, "a good relationship and a position of much brotherhood," resulted from the meeting. Less gentlemanly, the metal worker leaders said: "Brizola is going to continue with his PT and we are going to continue with the PT of the workers." The two PT's differ, however, as to the viability of the first.

That night, during a talk with the "authentics," the former governor was given the treatment usually reserved for a novice in politics, which obviously is not true in his case. The "authentics" attempted to warn him of the danger that the Sao Paulo PTB may be occupied by the "Adesistas" of the MDB. Brizola thanked them for the information without comment. With stoicism, he continued the line of good manners, violated all the time by those who, after all, had invited him for a political talk. "When he noted that his questioners did not want a serious conversation, he began to joke, saying that his primary concern were the children of Brazil," revealed one of his advisers. In fact, Brizola has revealed himself to be a master of dissimulation when faced with controversy. He does not answer to provocations and if he senses hostility, he goes into digressions, which if not interrupted can possibly last for hours.

Threat to Simon

In the past 3 weeks, there have been no new entry of legislators into the ranks of the PTB, however, Brizola does not appear to be worried about that lack. Neither the party reform plan sent by the government to Congress, nor the desperate attempts to keep the MDB united--such as the document signed by 22 senators last week--discourage the former governor. "We have the capability of organizing the party from the top to the bottom, as a parliamentary support, as well as of organizing it from the bottom to the top, creating directorates in a third of the municipalities," he believes. Brizola was irritated by the senators' document, but he is convinced that he has what it takes to create the PTB. In it, he first wants to be a great party chief, and therefore, he says he is not thinking of a candidacy.

The Sao Paulo marathon, which forced him to drink cup after cup of water and aspirin to neutralize the effects of three packs of Minister cigarettes daily, did not separate Brizola from his other regional bases. On Wednesday he talked over the direct dialing long-distance system with Senator Pedro Simon as soon as he found out that he was one of the signers of the MDB senators' document. "I told Simon that I was surprised at his signing," he revealed, "since it prevents his entry into the PTB." Sure of the control he exercises over the PTB in Rio Grande do Sul, he uttered some threats: "If the senator were to be an MDB candidate for governor in 1982, he will not have our support. The PTB will run its own candidate even if it has to be a humble comrade."

8908
CSO: 3001

MDB MODERATES CONCERNED ABOUT COMMUNIST INFLUENCE

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO In Portuguese 25 Oct 79 p 2

[Text] Deputy Walber Guimaraes (Brazilian Democratic Movement [MDB] of Parana), one of the coordinators of the MDB moderate group, announced yesterday in Brasilia that he is going to submit a document to his colleagues tonight, which he will take to Ulysses Guimaraes, national party chairman, expressing "concern at growing communist infiltration into the MDB."

"We are deeply concerned and we endorse the reaction by the moderate group against the revealed communist infiltration into the MDB. It is true that the party does not require ideological statements from its members," he said, "but it is also true that coexistence will be unbearable. The Communist Party will lead the MDB to an irremediable division."

Walber Guimaraes said that the moderates were already concerned at the behavior of leader Freitas Nobre "who opened the doors of the party to the communists," and that the picture has become worse now with the statement by Luiz Carlos Prestes asking the communists to support the MDB.

Ulysses Guimaraes, questioned about the document the moderates should present today, declared: "The MDB fights for the implantation of democracy in Brazil. I have no information on it and I am unaware of the existence of communists in the MDB."

In turn, Freitas Nobre did not retreat: "I have nothing to withdraw from the statements I have made. The MDB has a democratic party and whoever supports it cannot be subjected to having to make an ideological statement. That, also, has been the position of the party, precisely because it differs from the methods the government has adopted for entry into public service, union elections, university registration or teaching contracts. If infiltration could exist, the responsibility would belong to the government which does not allow the organization of the Communist Party."

In Rio, Eurico Rezende, the governor of Espirito Santo, after saying he was against the legalization of the communist party, asked: "Why did Prestes not advocate the legalization of other parties, ARENA [National Renewal Alliance] and the MDB, over there in Russia?

8908
CSO: 3001

SENATOR WOULD BAR PCB FROM JOINING MDB

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 24 Oct 79 p 2

[Text] Senator Paulo Brossard, in a press interview broadcast in Rio yesterday, said that he does not see how communists could be admitted into the MDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement]. He said that because of the party program, the communists would not have a chance in the present opposition party.

Brossard did not wish to make a direct reply as to whether he would allow the entry of Luiz Carlos Prestes into the MDB in case the present parties are not abolished.

"That is a hypothesis and I am not accustomed to speaking on hypotheses. However, since the MDB appeared, it has had a clear program of defense of full democracy, which is not the case with the communists. I do not know what the communists would do in the MDB," commented the senator to a Carioca station.

Dom Avelar

The archbishop of Salvador and primate of Brazil, dom Avelar Brandao Vilela, yesterday revealed, at the request of newsmen, a note in which he comments on the possible legalization of the Brazilian Communist Party [PCB]. Despite the fact that he does not totally disagree with the attempts by the PCB, dom Avelar begins the note by maintaining that "between communism and Christianity there are clear and undeniable points of philosophical differences."

Dom Avelar Brandao, who asked that the note not be published partially, also states that "the Brazilian people, who accept structural reforms and changes in behavior, in their immense majority do not accept the theories of atheist communism and its totalitarian and omnipotent political mentality.

The complete note by the archbishop of Salvador is as follows:

Between communism and Christianity there are clear and undeniable points of philosophical differences. They are concepts of life which are not compatible.

The Brazilian people, who accept structural reforms and changes of behavior, in their immense majority do not accept the theories of atheist communism and its totalitarian and omnipotent mentality.

With respect to the possible legalization of the Communist Party, we are now facing another totally different problem. It is known that the present trend of the adult democracies leans toward its coexistence within the social body. In the specific case of Brazil, I believe that such a path should not be forced at a time in which a gradual process of redemocratization is underway.

It is necessary, first of all, to know if that type of absorption would be possible and opportune at a time when so many other problems are being debated, some of them very passionately.

In my understanding, the new march of Brazil cannot be truncated or agitated. Be that as it may, it is important for the judgement of all Brazilians of all religious and political beliefs to learn the programs and theories of all the parties being organized, without ignoring those which have more daring intentions."

8908
CSO: 3001

NEWSPAPER ADVOCATES OIL SUPPLY POLICY CHANGES

PY272319 Rio de Janeiro JORNAL DO BRASIL in Portuguese 22 Dec 79 p 10 PY

[Editorial: "Lesson From the Crisis"]

[Text] There are two bitter lessons to be learned from the blackmail to which officials of the National Iranian Oil Company [NIOC] subjected the representatives of Petrobras during recent negotiations. Without any acceptable reason--except, of course, the impudent utilization of its position of strength as an oil exporting enterprise--the NIOC informed Petrobras that henceforth it will supply Brazil only 30,000 barrels per day, which represents a dramatic drop from the 150,000 barrels per day supplied in the past. The conclusion is that Petrobras can no longer consider NIOC a regular and respectable supplier. There is no way one can play under these rules.

The first lesson to be drawn from this sorry episode is that it has become impossible for some time already to maintain company-to-company relations in the volatile and unpredictable, and many times irresponsible, international petroleum market. There is the obviously attenuating circumstance that Iran has been covered by a cloud of irrationality which was blown in by a mysticism as modern as the crusades. Throughout the episode involving the U.S. hostages, Brazilian diplomats acted with ability, precisely to avoid mixing two serious problems such as the violation of the human rights of U.S. citizens and the supply of oil to Brazil. Acting this way, Brazil could assume that the question of oil imports from Iran would be handled within a political framework broader than the framework of a company-to-company commercial operation. The negotiations had the outcome they did because Petrobras, disregarding Law 2004 and all the misfortune it caused, proved itself incpable of conducting foreign policy.

The second lesson to be drawn from this unfortunate episode--which was really a dramatic consequence of the OPEC decision to leave the international market at the mercy of the voraciousness of each member country--is that there is no use of the two typical Brazilian attitudes in the face of the successive oil disaster, that is, the attitudes of crying endlessly and that of playing smart.

There is no use either in kneeling, sobbing convulsively, toward Mecca as though there were no other alternatives or in supposing once more that we will manage, with typical Brazilian cleverness and cunning, to unexpectedly obtain friendly prices from and strike cordial relations with oil producers.

There are alternatives if we have determination and courage. But there is no room for Latin American cleverness in this game.

The era of cheap oil has ended--no doubt about this. And there are no alternatives left other than the determination to conserve, to develop alternate energy sources and, above all, to export, to exchange raw materials and manufactured products for oil as Japan and the FRG are doing, thus avoiding bankruptcy despite the fact that they do not produce a drop of oil. The world will not come to an end because of OPEC or because, after setting up that disastrous cartel, OPEC failed to arrive at a consensus in Caracas. Middle East geopolitics have changed, as di the equilibrium of power throughout the world, granting a lopsided bargaining--and blackmailing--power to oil exporting countries.

But the Western economy, the capitalist economy more precisely, has already succeeded in controlling crises of similar proportions, such as the two world wars and the 1929 and 1973 crises. Unfortunately the ripples of the latter just hit Brazil a few months ago.

The Brazilian economy has to retrench behind appropriate measures adopted with a pluralist view toward economic solutions. Taking this path, it will be possible to consume less oil, replace it more rapidly and, above all, earn money in strong currencies to purchase needed oil. We have been bogged down in this crisis for 6 years, and there has been enough time to learn that we need determination and competence. And, moreover, that we need hold onto the belief that at the end of this tunnel we will have managed to rebuild the structure of an industry mounted on automobile wheels, as well as to overcome depressions, recessions and cooling-offs by making our economy stronger, more efficient and really capitalistic.

CSO: 3001

PETROBRAS OFFICIAL WORRIED OVER LONG-TERM SITUATION

PY271959 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 23 Dec 79 p 35 PY

[Excerpts] Brazilian Petroleum Corporation commercial director Carlos Santanna said in Rio yesterday that "The short-term situation of Brazil's oil supply causes no concern. The medium and long-term situation is disquieting, however, to the point of being a cause of anguish, because we do not know what the next move by the exporting countries will be, and the recent OPEC meeting showed that as far as playing the role of a moderator is concerned, this organization has failed."

Petrobras' commercial director said that Brazil's supply is guaranteed during the first half of next year and indicated that he sees no "threat" of rationing in the short term, at least as far as Petrobras' capability of supplying the country is concerned. Santanna also promised that Brazil will not resort to the "spot" market during the first half of next year. However, he did not want to make any forecasts beyond that.

Carlos Santanna, who returned from Tehran the day before yesterday, together with a delegation of Petrogras officials, without having reached an agreement, said that the negotiations did not fail, but that they were merely postponed. According to him it would have been a failure if Petrobras had agreed to buy oil on the "spot" market. He said that Iran is a country which has to be "approached" in a more "political" manner, bearing mutual interests in mind. He explained that the Iranian officials had felt the need to resort to dialog and left the door open for future negotiations in January without there being any sort of breakdown.

CSO: 3001

ORTUZAR REPLIES TO CRITICS, DEFENDS DRAFT CONSTITUTION

Santiago HOY in Spanish 28 Nov 79 pp 11-14

[HOY interview with Enrique Ortuzar; date and place not given]

[Text] Not even the statement of the president's daughter, Lucia Pinochet, makes him lose that inalterable deliberateness. She told EL MERCURIO, "the constitutional plan does not really reflect the mind of the president." Enrique Ortuzar regards that as a matter of personal opinion. "If I were not certain that I enjoyed the trust of the president of the republic, I would not be presently performing the functions with which he has honored me," he asserted.

Besides, he said, he likes the debate about the plan and the future institutional system and believes that everyone should express his opinion, including the members of the commission of "the 24"; although he agrees with the minister of interior that use of a public function or television network are not justified "because that would be breaking the political recess."

It could be said that he is more a jurist than a politician; or both at the same time. The press has been the center of his concern since the time of the "gag law," when he was minister under Jorge Alessandri. The communists gave it that label, he said. And they are the leit motiv of his political action, aimed basically at preventing them from participating in public life.

At 64 years of age (married, with six children) he looks younger, and he is not displeased about that. Gentlemanly and amiable, formal, at times somewhat tense and with great speaking ability, he replies to all questions with the diligence of a professor. He relates also that, despite the fact that he is Catholic, he has become somewhat nonobserving. "More than once I had to leave the church because the sermons dealt with current politics," he explained.

A lover of authority, which shines through in each line of the constitutional plan and in his admiration for strongmen such as Alessandri and Pinochet, he says about himself: "In all the actions of my life, I believe I act with

a sense of authority but of just authority and always with affection. And with a trace of humor, adds: "I am convinced that people, children and women, like authority, but just and with affection; and that when they do not find a man with authority, they look for him elsewhere."

The Criticism

[Question] Did you expect so much opposition to the constitutional plan, including among the adherents such as Julio Duran, Federico Willoughby, or Francisco Bulnes, who have said that that is not the constitution they wanted for the future of Chile?

[Answer] When one holds a public position one has to be exposed to every type of criticism. So that I have not been surprised by much of that criticism. But what has caught my attention is the fact that some democratic sectors have not understood where the enemy really is. The precise aspects should not divide those of us who wish to give Chile a basic charter that will insure a strong democracy. I believe that with time, those who have differing opinions will come to understand that it is essential that we Chileans who desire a sovereign and free country unite to give our country the political constitution it needs at this time that the world is going through.

[Question] Even General Pinochet has said that he is prepared to accept all the changes to the plan because it is like a son, that can return to him greatly changed from the Council of State. What would be your reaction if the changes made in it are so basic that it may seem like another plan? Some are already speaking of the "Alessandri plan."

[Answer] I have participated in all the discussions in the Council of State, as a member of the same, and I am completely satisfied with the way the plan has been dispatched so far, with very detailed and conscientious study. This means, without revealing the nature of the discussions, which are secret, that in my opinion, the plan prepared by the constitutional commission is not going to change basically.

The 1925 Constitution

[Question] It is known that within the Council of State there is a group called "the 25," which favors the 1925 constitutional reform and setting aside this plan. Among them reportedly are Jorge Alessandri, Gabriel Gonzalez, Julio Philippi, Juan de Dios Carmona, Hector Humeres and others. Haven't you been more Papist than the Pope?

[Answer] Although the question contains some errors of assessment, I am compelled to maintain the secrecy of the discussions in the Council of State. Nevertheless, we must keep in mind that in his press articles, Juan de Dios Carmona has emphatically and repeatedly maintained that it is necessary to create a new and vigorous democracy. We should also recall

that the president of the Council of State, himself, Jorge Alessandri, in his speech at the formal installation of that organ, declared that it was necessary to build a new institutional system from its very foundations. I do not know of any opinions that are in favor of returning to the past except for the sector called "the 24" group, which really wishes to return to a liberal, naive and defenseless democracy like the one we experienced and which led the country to the greatest moral, political, social, economic and institutional chaos in history.

[Question] Federico Willoughby, for his part, states that the constitutional plan "presumes a republic alien to the conditions and commitments that inspire the transformation proposed by the armed forces, which can achieve their goals with a transitional statute appropriate to their own regime." Do you not believe that this position is shared in government circles and could prevail? The idea is that this plan is not in accord with the current situation of Chile.

[Answer] We have striven precisely to prepare a plan that is not only appropriate to our national situation but also to the situation the world is going through.

[HOY] Ortuzar dwells on the democratic tradition of Chile, its history, its institutions and the "great principles and values embodied in 11 September, which have been especially considered." Also the danger that looms over the contemporary world--Marxism--"that takes over the states from within," and he concludes, stressing:

[Answer] If there is anything I am deeply convinced and conscientious of it is that this basic charter, the draft of which we have prepared, is perfectly adapted to the circumstances the country is experiencing and the national situation.

[Question] The daughter of the president, herself, Lucia Pinochet Hiriart, pointed out "it must be kept in mind that the constitutional plan does not really reflect the mind of the president. Where do you stand?

[Answer] I feel deep friendship and esteem for Lucia Pinochet. I believe it is a matter of her personal opinion, which merits all respect. But be assured that if I were not certain that I enjoyed the trust of the president of the republic I would not be presently performing the functions with which he has honored me. I would have presented my definitive and irrevocable resignation. And I certainly would not have joined the group of the discontented but would continue to be a supporter of this government, because we Chileans have a duty of undying gratitude for those who regained for us the freedom and sovereignty of the country. That is my reply.

The Question of Power

[Question] General Pinochet admitted that the problem lies in where power resides, how power is generated, and who holds power? Do you not believe

that all sectors should have been consulted on such a fundamental question through a constituent assembly elected by the people.

[Answer] The constitutional commission has not worked behind closed doors, rather it has consulted all of the most representative sectors of the nation. Not only professors of constitutional law, but personalities representing professional associations, management guilds labor unions, youth, women's organizations, etc. At the same time, the Council of State has done the same thing. And the institutional discussion that is taking place demonstrates that all sectors of the country have had possibility of making their observations regarding this document felt. Furthermore, I do not believe that a constituent assembly is the most appropriate means for considering a basic charter. The juridico-political tradition of the country demonstrates that.

[Question] In any case, the problem remains of where power resides, how power is generated, who holds power...

[Answer] That is, it is one of the important things that will have to be resolved at the proper time by the president and the government junta and by the people, expressing themselves through a plebiscite.

[HOY] Enrique Ortuzar points out that there were differing opinions on the matter within the constitutional commission. He himself proposed a procedure of preselection of candidates for the presidency of the republic followed by the election, but that was a minority opinion. "It can very well happen," he said, "that the president of the republic or the Government Junta may have an opinion different from that held by the constitutional commission. And I believe that that is even advisable: that does nothing but show the complete independence with which the commission has carried out its duties, which His Excellency has recognized on several occasions.

[Question] It is said that in the end power resides in the armed forces through the Security Council, which approves the "national objective."

[Answer] There is nothing more incorrect. According to the text of the plan, the armed forces are subordinated in their structure and in their action to constitutional juridical ordinance. The "national objective" does not have greater mandatory force, as expressly stipulated in the plan, than that of the juridical regulation that embodies it. If it is a decree, it will only have the force of the decree. And if it is a law, it will have the force of law.

Pluralism

[Question] For many, that protected democracy that is proposed is nothing more than exchanging freedom for security, for which reason, they say, that as soon as this regime disappears that constitution will not serve and we will have to draft another one. How do you reply?

[Answer] That criticism, I will I dare to state emphatically, implies the most absolute ignorance of the plan. Because if there is something that characterizes it, it is precisely its devotion to freedom. To demonstrate that, suffice it to read the chapter pertaining to constitutional rights and duties; the new guarantees and rights envisioned, the legal recourses established precisely for the defense of freedom and the basic rights of the individual.

[Question] It so happens that when you speak of the failures of the previous democracy "which did not guarantee the dignity and freedom of the individual, which led the country to a totalitarian regime; that made it possible for one of the branches of the state to assume the essential functions of the others and"--you say--"exposed Chile to losing its sovereignty in an irreversible manner," many believe that that is exactly the framework for the present situation...

[Answer] I believe that conclusion is absolutely out of line. With regard to the past, it is a reality of which no one can be ignorant. If it had not been so neither the legitimate rebellion of the people of Chile nor the military uprising would have taken place. With regard to the present, there is a military government that had its origin in a revolution, that has had to cope with an emergency situation and that--except for restrictions of a political nature--has respected all the other freedoms and basic rights of the individual.

[Question] You speak of ideological pluralism in the plan but what kind of pluralism is it where those who hold power leave their political opponents out of the game? Is that not the same thing that occurs in the Soviet Union?

[Answer] The plan envisions broad ideological pluralism, in which there is room for all types of differences that do not mean attacking democracy, freedom, and what we could call, the soul of the national being. Only totalitarian movements, organizations and parties are kept out. The watchword that democracy should permit everything, including its own destruction by its enemies and adversaries is a fallacy of communism into which many democrats unfortunately fall. Those who ignore its rules cannot participate in the democratic game. Those who seek to destroy democracy and freedom and--what is more serious--to crush the sovereignty of the peoples cannot avail themselves of them.

8711
CSO: 3010

PROMINENT CITIZENS DISCUSS ISSUE OF POLITICAL POWER

Santiago ERCILLA in Spanish 28 Nov 79 pp 8-11

[Text] Power has been and is the center of political interest. Throughout the history of mankind, philosophers, historians and political scientists have theorized about it, and public "servants" expend enormous effort in the struggle to gain it--while always denying it.

The delicate and sweet perfume of power, contrary to Freud's assertions, is very possibly what has moved men in history more than sex itself.

Power, writes W. A. Robson, is the essential definitive element of political life and all branches of that science have a single, common object: to study the nature, the exercise, the bases, the objectives and the effects of power in society.

For that reason, Pinochet is right when, referring to the future institutional system, he says: "Where is the problem? There is only one problem. Where does power reside? How is power generated? Who should hold power?

In the final analysis, that is the problem. For 18th Century philosophers, power derived only from men; for Christian doctrine, all power comes from God; while the natural order of society requires that there be some who lead and others who obey.

The manner in which power is structured and the way those who should exercise it are designated, declares Jorge Ivan Hubner, is left to the judgment of the citizens, according to the tendencies, the peculiarities and the customs of each country. Only in utopias are models of a theoretically perfect system established, applicable equally at all times and in all places.

ERCILLA posed Pinochet's questions to a group of representative persons to learn their opinion regarding where power resides, how it is generated, and who should hold power in the future institutional system.

Here are the answers of those queried, in alphabetical order:

Rene Abeliuk

In any democratic theory or system, sovereignty resides in the people; all political power emanates from them. Without prejudice to some modern forms of direct participation of the sovereign people in the direct exercise of power, modern democracy is representative, that is, the citizens designate responsible and transitory political authorities through periodic, free, secret, universal and well-informed elections, surrounded by other guarantees that insure a true expression of the popular will, such as, of course, the prior existence of election registers or lists, a really impartial authority to control the election, count the votes and hear the complaints that may arise, etc.

But that is not enough to constitute real democracy. It is also essential that the political constitution, the supreme expression of juridical order, also really emanate from the sovereign people; that it establish a real independence and separation of public powers, the only form that has been discovered thus far to prevent the abuse of any of them; that there exist strong political parties representative of the opinion of the citizenry, because they are irreplaceable in a well-organized democracy.

However, in my opinion, as important or more important that these formal and juridical elements, in order that an effective and solid democracy can exist, it is essential that there be a broad consensus of the citizens regarding the basic aspects of democratic operation, without prejudice to the natural differences on specific points. And above all, as the Chilean experience itself proves and recent history and events confirm, no democratic or autocratic political system can survive if the problems of poverty, backwardness, socio-economic differences, etc. are not resolved.

Patricio Aylwin

The answer to those three questions is given by Article 21 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, subscribed to by Chile and which every leader of a civilized country must recognize: "The will of the people is the basis of the authority of public power. That will is expressed through real elections, which must be held periodically through universal and equal suffrage and by secret vote..."

This means that the sovereignty or authority of the state to govern and to assert its independence resides in the people, its only titular head. Consequently, the power of leaders cannot have any other origin that the delegation of the people and it is generated in periodic elections by universal suffrage. And only who derives power from the free and sovereign will of the people, regularly expressed, exercises or "holds power" legitimately.

Ricardo Claro

Power is a natural need of society and has its origin in God as the creator of nature and of natural law.

Undoubtedly, those who exercise power need the consensus of the community because, as Sieyes states, power comes from above but trust comes from below.

I do not believe in the popular sovereignty proclaimed in the 18th Century by Rousseau and I believe, like Jacques Maritain, that it is a "preposterious idea" based on the myth of the general will.

Power can be generated in different ways, according to the form of government, the political system and historical circumstances. Thus, in a monarchy, power will be hereditary, in a democracy it can be generated by direct or indirect voting, with multiple election systems; authoritarian regimes are normally generated by extraordinary circumstances, since Roman law.

It is a historical error and a demonstration of ignorance to maintain that power emanates only from popular sovereignty. How is His Holiness the Pope elected ruler of the Vatican State?

Power should be held by a select group of persons that is willing to serve the common good, elected according to the system that is most in accord with the circumstances of a given nation.

Carlos Cruz-Coke

Constitutional doctrine points out that power resides in the nation, an abstract and juridical concept of the electorate; or in the people, considering the opinions of the citizens as a whole, as the holders of sovereignty.

Jean Bodin, a 16th Century political writer however, made a statement that has not lost its currency: "Sovereignty (power) belongs to whoever is capable of exercising it." That fact is manifest today, for example: President Carter of the United States has a popular mandate but evidently he does not gain anything by it if he is not able to exercise it. President Pinochet received a popular mandate in the 4 January 1978 referendum and has demonstrated his ability to exercise that commission.

In doctrine also, power is generated by the people or the nation through suffrage or through its will expressed in referenda or another form of exercising direct democracy.

That is the principle, which is valid. But in practice, the generation of power has become a technique, a system and even a fiction. Actually, a majority election system such as the British or French enables the democratic political groups and supporters of democracy to triumph handily over those who seek its destruction. They generate solid parliamentary majorities, protect the stability of the government and, through the good use of the election mechanism, prevent the victory of extremism to the detriment of the proportionality of political representation.

As for who should hold power, the answer has been given in the first question. But who should never hold power is precisely that agent of government or political movement that advocates the destruction of the democratic system, the replacement of a pluralistic system with dictatorship, of social democracy with tyranny. That is what happens with Marxism. As the political writer, Marcel Prelot, said, democracy is a system of fair play and you cannot play cards with someone who uses marked cards.

Enrique Evans

Supreme political power and national sovereignty are synonymous terms. Both express the essential capacity of the community of individuals who make up a nation to organize themselves as a state with complete autonomy and to set itself before the other states on a level of juridical equality.

How to organize the state, the functions of the authorities and public organs and their relationship to the individuals who inhabit the nation, all of which is regulated in the constitution, are matters the resolution of which belongs exclusively and solely to all the inhabitants, that is, the people. We deduce from that as an elementary corollary that no person or group, for reasons of blood or lineage, factors of race, creed or ideology, or the fact of carrying arms or of greater social or economic power can arrogate to himself or itself the power to organize the state, to designate the attributes of the organs of power and establish or recognize the rights of the citizens.

Political power or sovereignty, therefore, resides in the people, who exercise it through the plebiscites and election processes. In the former, the people resolve basic matters directly, such as the approval, reform or rejection of a constitution; in the latter, the people delegate the exercise of power to temporary and responsible authorities.

Those are the basic elements of political theory accepted in the Western world for centuries, practiced and sanctioned by the political institutions of Europe and America and embodied, without any exception, in all constitutional texts in our history.

From these facts, so starkly enunciated and so profound in their significance and content, it is possible to establish that:

1. Supreme political power resides in the people;

2. The public powers or state powers are generated in the manner provided in the constitution, with the necessary participation of the people in free, secret, sincere and informed election processes. That does not imply that the "all" the members of the state power structure must be chosen by popular election. A non-decisive part of some chamber, all of the judicial power, the administrative power and the comptroller power can be generated outside of the election process; and

3. State powers should be held and exercised by those who are elected or designated according to the constitution. Only that, normally, legitimizes power.

Jaime Guzman

I consider that the question about who should hold power in the new institutional system, or where power resides has its most appropriate answer in Article 5 of the constitutional draft, which states textually: "Sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. It is exercised by the people through the plebiscite and elections and by the authorities the constitution may establish."

As for how power should be generated, and concurring in that regard with the government's national objective, I believe that political authorities must be generated predominantly through universal suffrage without prejudice to seeking complementary formulas that will fill the vacuums and attenuate the deficiencies that system presents, for example, envisaging the selection of a third of the future senate by methods different from universal suffrage and that will incorporate the contribution of the moderation and experience of those who have served in the highest positions of responsibility in republican life. With regard to the judicial power, I am in favor of maintaining substantially the method for selection of its members as provided in the 1925 constitution; and with regard to the technical organizations that are created, I believe that we should seek the most suitable system in each case, which will almost never be popular suffrage. But as to political authorities, my opinion is categorically to the effect that universal, free, secret and informed suffrage must be the predominant method in a democracy. And I believe in the democratic form of government as the most appropriate for the normal future of Chile.

Enrique Ortuzar

In connection with the recent statements of the president of the republic with regard to the constitutional draft, to the effect that the problem consists in determining where political power resides and how power is generated, there have been many who have tried to deny the legitimacy of the present government, forgetting that the military uprising, bitterly sought by the people of Chile, received the approval then of those who now appear to question it as well as of their own party, probably because at that time they thought the revolution had a special consignee...

If that had occurred, those who in those days thought otherwise would not be saying today that the condition for becoming the leader of a country is to be elected by popular vote.

Since an attempt has been made to divert the problem posed by His Excellency, regarding where power resides and how it is generated, referring to the new institutional system, for the absurd and inexplicable purpose of

denying the legitimacy of the present government, I find it necessary to distinguish between the situation of abnormality or institutional breakdown that can occur in a country and complete normalcy.

In the situation of chaos or institutional breakdown, such as that that occurred in Chile during the Marxist regime, the rebellion of the people, is doctrinely legitimate if the deposed government has lapsed into illegitimacy of practice by having trampled upon the basic rights of people and inflicted serious damage to the common welfare; and with greater reason, if it constituted an imminent danger to the sovereignty of the country; and the government that assumes power is legitimate, if it is the expression of the will of the majority of those people.

Since those were the characteristics of the rebellion of the people of Chile and of the military uprising of 11 September 1973, the present military regime is unquestionably legitimate. And that was, furthermore, broadly ratified through the national referendum of 4 January 1978.

Not only do political writers recognize the legitimate right of rebellion by a people when there is no other effective way of putting an end to an infamous regime but it is recognized by various documents of great world significance, such as the Declaration of Indpendence of the United States, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights--which explicitly recognizes recourse to rebellion--the Declaration of the Rights of Man of the French Revolution, etc.

Having stated the foregoing, I will proceed to reply to the aforementioned questions, pertaining obviously to a situation of institutional normalcy.

With regard to where political power resides, naturally, my opinion coincides with the draft constitution, which establishes that sovereignty resides essentially in the nation, and that it is exercised by the people through the plebiscite and elections, and by the authorities the constitution establishes.

The institutional political system envisaged in the draft is based, certainly, on the exercise of executive, legislative, judicial and comptroller functions by various organs independent of each other, without prejudice to an appropriate interrelationship among them.

Referring the question--as it seems to be--to the political power that resides in the government, I believe, as is established in the draft, that the presidential system is the one that best agrees our tradition and the peculiarities of our people, but with a strong, just and impersonal authority of the Portal type and subject to appropriate inspection and control mechanisms of an administrative nature entrusted to the office of the comptroller general of the republic, charged with overseeing the legality of the actions of the administration, in a preventive way; of a political nature, exercised by the Chamber of Deputies; of jurisdictional control,

according to the nature of the case, entrusted to the ordinary courts of justice, of the courts for administrative disputes or the constitutional court.

The president of the republic exercises the government and administration of the state through the ministries and the public services and advisory agencies according to the constitution and the law in a functionally and territorially decentralized administration in order to make possible the harmonious and balanced development of the different regions and their right to participate in the perception and solution of the problems.

There were different opinions in the constitutional commission with regard to how this political power is generated.

The majority opinion, which I share, with the variant that I will indicate further on, inclined toward the system of direct presidential election by the people, with the provision that if none of the candidates obtains an absolute majority of votes validly cast a second election must be held limited to the two who obtained the highest relative majorities.

The majority of the commission believed that the system of direct election for president of the republic is the one that best agrees with our juridical tradition and the new institutional political system which grants greater powers to the president of the republic; consequently, it seems logical that in order that he may be able to exercise his position fully with greater moral authority, that it derive from the will of the people.

It is true that from our experience, the direct election system, on the one hand, has made possible demagogy and extremism, enabling a minority to gain power; and, on the other hand, has agitated and paralyzed the country for a long time on the occasion of each presidential campaign.

The possibility of a minority gaining power, is eliminated with the establishment of the so-called "second round" which the draft provides.

As for the direct election system opening the doors to demagogic extremism, it should be kept in mind that the whole new constitutional structure has been prepared on the basis of strengthening democracy so that it can defend itself effectively against this ill that has afflicted it in the past.

It seems unnecessary to delineate here all the juridical mechanisms established by the draft intended to prevent the disruptive action of the great enemies of democracy, namely, demagogy and totalitarianism.

Personally, I believe that the system of direct election of the president of the republic could be complemented through a mechanism aimed at establishing a preselection of the candidates, which would take place shortly before the election and which could consist of their designation by the senate or by requiring the sponsorship of 12 or 15 senators per candidacy.

This complementary procedure prior to the direct election would have the advantage of preventing even more the shortcomings that it may present, inasmuch as it makes it possible to limit the number of possible presidential candidacies. It prevents the election of the president of the republic from being the expression of a, many times, irrational or merely emotional decision and prevents the lengthy presidential campaigns that cause so much harm to the nation.

The minority of the commission, however, believed that the system of direct election by universal suffrage produces great agitation in the country, unleashes a demagogic race to gain power, thus every so often gambling with the destiny of Chile. That demagogic race is expressed mainly by arousing the appetites of the electorate, sometimes in unlikely terms, without considering that the possibilities of a developing country such as Chile are limited and the demands that can be aroused are many. Thus, the elected president cannot keep his promises resulting in disillusionment among the citizens and, as a natural consequence, producing a violent change in the political direction and economy of the country in the next election.

For that reason, the minority proposed the election of the president of the republic by a restricted body made up of the deputies and senators, regional and local delegates elected by the corresponding territorial organs, and of a small number of electors, by their own right, who have distinguished themselves in the life of the republic in an outstanding manner.

Pablo Rodriguez

At this moment, power resides, in an exceptional way, in the armed forces until the emergency that placed this country on the verge of national disintegration is overcome. There is no doubt that the legitimate source of power is in the will of the people, who must regain their right to name the supreme authorities of the state when normalcy is completely reestablished. That will happen, in my opinion, when the new political charter is approved and put into operation.

With regard to representative democracies, power is generated through channels of political participation. In the inorganic model, these channels are the parties; in the organic model, the intermediate bodies. I am a firm defender of the latter system because, although it has defects, the will of the citizens is expressed more legitimately and clearly. Unfortunately, the prevailing traditionalism makes many Chileans believe, wrongly, that there is no valid intermediary between the individual and the state other than the political party and that only universal suffrage can express the popular will.

In periods of crisis, power should be held by someone who is capable of maintaining it to reestablish order. In normal periods, whoever the people designate. But the problem consists in determining how the people express themselves or, stated another way, by what system authority is elected.

Chile must opt for a democratic model--I believe there is general consensus about this--but there is no consensus about what the subject model should be. Consequently, I believe that a referendum of the citizens that will make possible a definitive determination is essential. But I want to point out that this does not imply, as some believe, an immediate or sudden transfer of power to civilians. We should not skip the transition period that will be the master key to establishing the new institutional system.

Alejandro Silva

When society organizes itself into a state, it holds the power to lead that society to its objective, which is to pursue the welfare of all. That power has to be exercised through human wills that adopt the concrete decisions directed toward that end.

Since nature has not indicated who governs the state, that problem, namely of the governing system, has to be resolved by man, himself. Every system is acceptable that safeguards the rights of the individuals and groups that make up the state, which are superior to it and which it exists to guarantee; and that which violates them is inadmissible.

Democracy is that system that entrusts to the people, that is, to the same governed society, the supreme management of the general interest, which exercises it by approving the constitution by which it is governed, selecting the members of the basic public powers and making their freedoms and rights prevail.

Those who subscribe to the democratic ideal believe that it is the one that best accords with the natural equality and transcendent vocation shared by all men that calls them to participate in the difficult enterprise of leading political society, accrediting those who rule, expressing their opinion to those who must decide, and accepting the rules to which they must adapt their behavior and the order which they must obey.

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STUDY SHOWS INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN 1978 SIMILAR TO 1970

Santiago EL MERCURIO in Spanish 8 Dec 79 p A 3

[Text] The Debate and New Evidence

Discussions on the distribution of income are not new in the country and almost always have been supported by arguable and partial data. Usually those on the side of government maintain that income distribution has improved, while the detractors say just the opposite.

All recent governments have been subjected to the criticism that the economic situation is increasingly less bearable and that income distribution is more regressive. Independently of what the figures indicate, there is a popularized belief in the country that income tends to become concentrated and that the situation of the masses tends to deteriorate. The erroneous criticism of Marxist origin concerning the "inevitable concentration of income tendency" has greatly influenced the debates; and the absence of good empirical studies has led many persons of good faith to believe that the action of an economy based on private enterprise and competition of necessity leads to a worsening of income distribution.

An examination, however summary, of the opinions given on this subject by critics of the prevailing economic policy and, in general, by opponents of the present government produces an obvious truism: the repeated insistence on income concentration. Until around 1976, such a thesis had been presented with special emphasis on the cost of the economic recovery program which, according to the critics, was bearing exclusively on the most deprived sectors. Of course, on that occasion no one was able to present figures to really support such a statement.

When the present economic model began to yield its unquestioned results, criticism centered its fire on various external manifestations of well-being--the insistent objection to the consumption of so-called luxury goods--in order to deduce therefrom that a small sector of Chilean society was increasing its income in an extraordinary manner at the expense of the neediest. Once abain subjective opinions were involved, which were tinged by varied moral considerations and based implicitly on the Marxist postulates to which reference was made previously.

However, there is an appreciable body of studies throughout the world which destroys those Marxist prejudices. In the case of Chile, the cumulative information, although partial, is abundant and particularly significant.

The last study on income distribution which has just been released by the Economics Department of the University of Chile provides solid data to the effect that, contrary to what many have said, income distribution has not worsened nor do concentration tendencies appear to exist in the present system.

Economist Isabel Heskia, of the University of Chile, has used modern methodology to analyze encouraging survey data which the Economic Department has been gathering systematically since 1957. The study covers Greater Santiago, and the investigation is for a period of at least 6 years. Doubtless this is the most complete work on the subject ever completed in the country, and very probably it is without equal in all of Latin America.

Surveys on income levels are difficult and costly; therefore, the results should be looked at and interpreted carefully. The studies normally cover only monetary income; therefore, incorrect interpretations may be introduced, depending upon the use made of state subsidies. It is also possible that those surveyed did not give correct information about their real incomes and that this likewise produced distortions.

In spite of these problems and others which it is not pertinent to mention, the quality of the study which the University of Chile has just released to the public is worthy of note. For that reason, the principal results of this study merit examination.

Evolution of Income Levels

The first thing one observes is that average real income levels have been slowly and persistently improving, in small increments, since 1957. Average real income levels rose significantly in 1971 and 1972, in the face of the artificial expansion of the economy implemented by the Allende government. This situation, by definition, not sustainable, was changed in 1973 and by May 1973 the average income of the population was 25 percent less, in real terms, than in 1970. As will be remembered, in the months following May 1973, inflation accelerated at a fast pace; and there was no income adjustment, meaning that probably the lowest levels of real income occurred in the last few months of the Popular Unity government.

In the University of Chile study which covers the month of May each year, new decreases were observed in the recession years, 1974 and 1975, during which the average income of the population dropped to 42 percent of what it was in 1970.

The situation reversed itself beginning in 1976 and improved systematically until May 1978 when average incomes were 3.2 percent higher than in May 1970. It is clear that if the figures for 1979 were available, it would be noted with resepct to 1970 that there was a higher percentage of improvement than cited.

Consequently, the first thing which can be said is that the average income levels of May 1978, and certainly of today, are higher than those of 1970 and that the sharpest drop observed at a particular time took place precisely in the last year of the Allende government and in the final years of the world recession.

In the income sector, wages decreased 25.2 percent in 1973 compared to 1970, a rate that reached 39 percent in 1975. Beginning in 1976, wages started to rise until in May 1978 they were 8.9 percent higher than the average in 1970.

The incomes of independent workers were 10.2 percent higher in May 1978 than 1970, despite having decreased in large part in 1973 and 1975 in relation to wages. This clearly indicates that since the strong growth of the Chilean economy, in mid-1976, the incomes of independent workers have risen more rapidly than average wages.

There are noteworthy phenomena, such as the average incomes of domestic workers. In May 1978, these incomes were 32.6 percent higher than in 1970 and 19.7 percent above those of May 1971.

In May 1978, almost all sectors showed real improvements compared to May 1970. Only the sectors of employers, public employees and retired persons experienced decreases. All other sectors improved their situations, including laborers, independent workers, employees and personnel of the Armed Forces and Forces of Order.

It should not be forgotten that this study only provides information up to May 1978; therefore, at present the situation in all sectors should be better than that of 1970.

The study tends to confirm the known information on wages, salaries and income and the official view that incomes are already significantly higher than those of 1970 or 1973. It is also deduced from the study that the drop in incomes was principally at the end of the Popular Unity government and that the undesirable levels of income were maintained until 1976, after which persistent recovery is observed.

Income Distribution

The results indicate that in general income distribution in 1978 was similar to that of 1970. In reality, in the last 22 years, very few changes have been observed, with the best income distributions occurring between 1957 and 1964, 1971 and 1972 and in the recession years, 1974 and 1975.

With regard to those periods, present income distribution would be lesser, although the same is not true in comparison to 1970 and a few years in the second half of the 1960s.

Contrary to what some persons have spread around ad nauseum, income distribution improved in 1974 and 1975, thus giving lie to the statement that the costs of economic recovery were paid for basically by the poor.

Comparing 1970 with 1978, it is noted that the poorest 20 percent increased their real incomes 7.8 percent, the next poorest 30 percent increased their incomes by 8.7 percent. As for the next higher 30 percent, their incomes decreased 1.3 percent, while the highest income group had increases of 4.1 percent. These figures indicate that the poorest 50 percent experienced income increases greater than the most comfortable 50 percent. Therefore, it is understood that recent economic policy definitely has not harmed the poor; on the contrary, it appears to have improved their relative condition.

This impression would be reinforced if it is kept in mind that the non-monetary benefits given by the state, which are excluded from this study, have become concentrated in the lowest income sectors.

In summary, it can be said that statements about possible income concentrations and the accentuation thereof have remained without foundation, according to the University of Chile study.

Thus another criticism which has been particularly implanted in public opinion, in spite of the fact that it is without justification, has been clarified.

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PRESS FREEDOM, DISINFORMATION WEIGHED BY PEREZ HERRERO

Havana PRISMA LATINOAMERICANO in Spanish Aug 79 pp 20-23

[Interview with Antonio Perez Herrero, member of the Secretariat of the PCC, by Leopoldo Formoso: "Against Disinformation"]

[Text] Havana--The Cuban revolution will not renounce its solidarity with the peoples of Nicaragua and Puerto Rico despite renewed and unjustified aggression by the United States which still continues its blockade of Cuba.

Antonio Perez Herrero, member of the Secretariat of the PCC [Communist Party of Cuba], stated this in an interview granted to PRISMA in which he analyzed the role of the press and journalists on the continent as well as the harmful work of mass media in the hands of the multinationals.

Following is the text of the interview.

PRISMA: What is your evaluation of the present situation of the mass media in Latin America?

Antonio Perez Herrero: The development of the press and other journalistic work in underdeveloped nations, especially in Latin America, must be analyzed in relation to the news monopoly of the multinationals.

This monopoly has many different implications but the most important is the selection of what people should know, based on imperialist interests.

As to news, our countries are also major producers of raw material which goes through a complex mechanism to return to us as a finished product, supposedly appropriate for consumption. In this case, it is an ideological and, to a great degree, cultural product aimed at controling the thinking and acting of millions of people.

The large imperialist news agencies not only decide what a major portion of mankind should know but they arbitrarily exercise a veto over what they should not know or what they should only know partially or in fragments.

PRISMA: What experience does Cuba have in this field?

Perez Herrero: We know these procedures through our own experience. For years we have seen how the reality of our country has been openly distorted, our problems exaggerated and our successes ignored.

To give only one example, remember the 11th World Festival of Youth and Students, virtually sabotaged by a wall of silence.

It is also true that, during all these years, there have been organs that have reported about our country objectively and journalists who have acted with the necessary professional integrity, expressing their points of view independently.

Just as we know how to respond to the slander of those who insult us, we understand those who write based on distorted information and we recognize those who are concerned that the truth about our country prevail.

News Dependence

PRISMA: How do you feel about news dependence in Latin America and throughout the world?

Perez Herrero: In Latin America, the problems related with information are part of the structure of dependent capitalism which reigns in these countries.

Information has become a gigantic business whose beneficiaries are mainly the imperialist countries.

This is a recorded phenomenon whose theoretical explanation was offered a long time ago. In the middle of the last century, Karl Marx wrote:

"The bourgeoisie has stripped all the professions of their honor; until then, they were considered venerable and worthy of respect. It has made the doctor, lawyer, priest, poet and scholar its paid servants."

Fortunately, these are not consummated or irreversible processes.

The revolution, which someday will knock at every door, will not only sweep away all forms of exploitation, poverty and political

dependence with its reformist dynamism but will make it possible for all goods, including information, to be the patrimony of the peoples and for those who practice the profession of journalism to be their most faithful servants.

Then progressive men and groups, frequently unarmed, will not have to confront the colossal forces that now monopolize this field. To achieve this, every effort, no matter how modest it may seem, has an incalculable value.

I do not believe it is necessary to emphasize the need for strong solidarity in this sense.

It seems appropriate to cite PRENSA LATINA which recently celebrated its 20th anniversary and has played an important role in publicizing Latin American reality as well as the efforts of a large group of countries to consolidate a so-called information "pool" for the non-alined countries.

This is one more demonstration that the fight for a new international economic order is inseparably united to efforts to restructure mechanisms for the diffusion of information and a demonstration that only through the breakdown of imperialist dominion in this field will freedom of the press have any meaning. Under the circumstances that prevail in many countries, it is illusory.

PRISMA: In your opinion, what role should the progressive press play?

Perez Herrero: It is necessary to emphasize the role that the progressive press should play in the evolution of political processes that develop in all the countries on the continent in varying degrees of maturity. The position that progressive journalists should hold to provide appropriate political orientation of the people, to contribute to the development of the popular culture and to fight for understanding and rapprochement among the peoples, combined with subsequent support for causes that benefit the people, should also be emphasized.

There are unavoidable tasks that a committed journalist, an activist for national causes and aspirations, has to undertake.

It is necessary to denounce the unfair competition between the large press and the more modest organs, especially the former's efforts to crush any attempts toward a labor press.

The imperialists and their servants try to silence PRENSA LATINA. There are still several governments that will not allow it to operate. Any independent news effort will face similar dangers.

It is also essential to practice active solidarity with imprisoned or persecuted journalists and to denounce the closing of newspapers and magazines and the confiscation of issues.

PRISMA: What difference is there between the Cuban press of yesterday and today?

Perez Herrero: The complete fulfillment of the role of the journalist and of the press in a socialist society is a fundamentally important aspect for our workers.

The vanguard party of the working class stimulates the development of the national press and wide-ranging work in the analysis of our reality and our time.

Its pages are living testimony, indispensable for knowing our revolutionary process in depth from its beginning until this year when we celebrate its 20th anniversary.

If we set aside certain peculiarities and unimportant differences, the prerevolutionary press in Cuba was similar to what existed at that time in Latin America and, to a great degree, to what is published in many parts of our continent now.

In Cuba, there was an extraordinary number of different bourgeois publications which printed thousands of copies.

The so-called serious press, tenacious defender of free enterprise and private property and mouthpiece for the large landowners and the most reactionary capitalists, held a special place.

The best example was DIARIO DE LA MARINA which operated for more than 100 years and which had the shame of being the organ of the Spanish reactionaries--proslavery and anti-Cuban--in the last century and then a faithful servant of the U.S. imperialists.

As a youth, Marti lashed out at it from the student newspaper EL DIABLO COJUELO. What he stated on that occasion remained valid until the DIARIO DE LA MARINA folded.

It was the ally of Weyler and the U.S. occupation forces, politicians and gamblers of every type who plundered the country for more than 50 years of neocolonialism and was always a defender of the clergy. It supported Franco in the Spanish Civil War, Hitler and Mussolini

until the United States entered World War II, McCarthy and his southern representatives during the "Cold War" hysteria and, of course, Batista and his bloody tyranny.

Other organs of the bourgeois press took the same road although none for as long a time or as openly anti-Cuban. They were boring with their announcements and ridiculous reports of baptisms, birthdays and weddings, great banquets and ostentatious parties as well as equally opulent Masses and funerals, all covered on several pages under the ironical name of "social news."

There were many pages of "advertisements" of the most diverse type.

At the doors of these newspaper offices--which usually posted their pages of "classified" advertisements outside their buildings--hundreds of people, outcasts in a country that had only 6 million inhabitants then with more than 500,000 unemployed, gathered around these pages to try to find a job among the offers. This was generally in vain since there were not enough for the extraordinary number of unemployed people nor were the jobs serious in many cases.

Many times they concealed employment agencies that imposed unfair conditions on the worker who accepted their help or clever requests to carry out obscure and shameful tasks.

Influences

PRISMA: Was the press in prerevolutionary Cuba under U.S. influence?

Perez Herrero: The magazines and newspapers of the large bourgeois press in the country were available for the mass diffusion of "news" rewritten by U.S. press agencies as well as articles, features and illustrated stories.

A faithful support for the infamous regime, the press frequently received direct subsidies from the government, the U.S. Embassy or both.

Its influence was used to obtain division in the popular sectors and transmit the distorted image of reality that the Yankee agencies offered. The number of journalists needed decreased since most of the issues were written in the United States.

If in the first years of the republic some publications with cultural aspirations appeared, they disappeared little by little or became part of the information system imposed by imperialism. Large press organs were converted into national news monopolies.

PRISMA: Could independent journalism be practiced then?

Perez Herrero: There were isolated efforts by small publications to practice independent journalism and some journalists who worked for the bourgeois press itself maintained their integrity in spite of their difficult circumstances.

Labor newspapers and Marxist newspapers and publications connected to the first PCC appeared like the newspaper HOY, but they were almost always persecuted, fought and attacked and, at times, brutally closed by national imperialist agents.

There were also revolutionary newspapers like LA CALLE and ALMA MATER, closed and banned in later years (before 1959), and an underground press that had a powerful influence on information for the people in the cities or in the mountains.

RADIO REBELDE functioned in the Sierra Maestra. Other revolutionary organs were: the newspaper EL CUBANO LIBRE whose first editor was Che; SURCO on the Second Front; SIERRA MAESTRA and CARTA SEMANAL, underground organs; and MELLA by the Socialist Youth. These were the most legitimate components of Cuban revolutionary journalism whose teacher and master was Jose Marti.

PRISMA: What measures did the revolution adopt to change that situation of the press?

Perez Herrero: In January 1959, the bourgeois press--in the hands of the proimperialist oligarchy--tried to retain its position. Many newspapers and magazines offered hypocritical loyalty to the revolution, conditioned, as history would prove, on the revolution no longer being a revolution.

Our working class knows what freedom of the press is since it knew how to win it and practice it. It also knows what oligarchies are and knows U.S. imperialism well.

The press was not nationalized; that is, the press did not become a state organ in the sense that our enemies claim.

The state and all the political power that it represents was taken from the exploiters and a state representing the power of the workers arose. The workers created the organizations based on their interests and the organs of diffusion were, by virtue of the popular action, their publicizers.

The national peculiarities of this process could not be called a Cuban model of Marxism nor are we communists of "another type."

Our revolutionary process definitely follows the theory of scientific socialism and its peculiar aspects do not separate it but connect it to this and enrich the experience of the international labor and communist movement whose ideology is Marxism-Leninism.

Socialism offers the workers freedom of expression and truly guarantees it.

The exploiters were not actually denied the chance to express themselves. They are absolutely impeded from exploiting because it would be incompatible and absurd if exploitation continued when the revolution aimed precisely at eliminating every form of exploitation of man.

The paper "On mass media" approved at the First Party Congress stated:

"From the Marxist-Leninist point of view, it is unavoidable that the working class in power exercise control over these important instruments so that they act in the interest of revolutionary transformations as organs of the party, the state and the mass and social organizations to educate, inform, orient, organize and mobilize the people by appealing to reason and conscience."

Socialist Press

PRISMA: In your opinion, what is the role of the press under socialism? How has that role materialized in Cuba?

Perez Herrero: Socialism implies a qualitative change in journalism. The press becomes an important element in the social, political and economic transformation of society.

The journalist is not a captive of private enterprise or an isolated entity, easy to corrupt, blackmail or persecute, as under a capitalist society.

He is a free man, truly free, and his immediate task is the construction of the socialist society, the most beautiful and just of man's ideals.

Alienation and unemployment remain behind, buried forever.

The workers include him in their ranks because he belongs there and, as such, contributes to guarantee the right of the popular masses to truly objective information. He acts as a vital element in a society whose objectives coincide with the objectives of the man who spreads the truth and defends the society in which these relations are possible.

Socialism means respect for the complete dignity of man to which Marti aspired; it is even more. It is the only society in which human dignity assumes its true dimensions, rid forever of sordid selfishness and the degrading conditions that a capitalist society imposes, especially on the men who work for the press.

The duties of a journalist toward society are responsibly fulfilled because he gives his intellectual efforts to the workers.

He is part of the advanced form of democracy under a socialist society and, as such, his opinions are backed by the classist position which demands absolute adherence to the truth and to the working class, real and profound domination of the subjects discussed and ability not only to inform but to orient creative work with his opinions and analyses.

To achieve this, he has to be receptive to the needs and demands of the masses, listen to their suggestions, know their opinions and learn from the reader who is no longer a passive consumer of prefabricated opinions but an aware person with general cultural and political knowledge, center of the news and, at the same time, avid consumer of what occurs in this country and abroad.

Role of Criticism

PRISMA: Does the Cuban press criticize? Do you consider this beneficial?

Perez Herrero: It would be impossible to refer to the role of the press in a socialist society without analyzing, even briefly, one of its specific functions: criticism.

It is not necessary to refute the repeated lies that criticism cannot be made in socialist countries.

The most solid base of scientific socialism is one of the largest critical efforts made by man's intellect: Marx' doctrine and his objective and devastating criticism of capitalism.

It is a good time, 20 years after the Cuban revolution, to recall that "La historia me absolvera" [History Will Absolve Me] is a critical analysis using deep and objective Marxist criteria of the historic reality when the Cuban revolution took place.

Our press and our journalists write criticism and the workers and the party encourage the development of critical analysis in our press. This can be verified by following the daily development of our publications.

It is the party's opinion that criticism is the mobilizer that helps solve problems, correct errors and fight residuals of the past that persist in our society.

This does not mean sensationalism, arguments to attract readers or, of course, superficial evaluations and unimportant analyses.

This does not mean writing criticism for itself or filling our newspapers daily with thoughtless criticism.

It means an accurate analysis of reality, of the facts that we have before us, in order to learn them well and give opinions and evaluations that contribute well to the achievement of common objectives.

The mentioned paper approved by the First Party Congress stated: "Criticism is a substantial factor in the activities of the party, the state and the masses under socialism. Without it, it is not possible to conceive of the advance of society."

When the mass media critically point out a problem, analyze its causes and later mention solutions used, this is a direct way to relate to the masses concerning problems caused by a new society and to increase and direct their participation in the fight to solve them.

Our own press is subject to the daily criticism of its readers. In general, we have analyzed the national press and carefully listened to the opinions of our Latin American comrades because the best way to develop our work is to know its weaknesses.

PRISMA: What is the cause of the low printing quality in some newspapers and magazines?

Perez Herrero: There are comrades who frequently point out problems in form: quality of paper, lack of color, etc. This is true but these problems will last for some time because they depend on factors that we cannot quickly change.

Information involves industrial means and complex and expensive technological processes.

The equipment in the country in 1959--most of which is still functioning and is used for the present diffusion and information tasks--is capitalist equipment and, therefore, needs parts and accessories from those countries for good operation.

The United States imposed a total economic blockade on us 20 years ago to destroy the revolution. The blockade, which has remained

unchanged under different U.S. administrations, affects the graphics and press industry as it does all national industry and, in general, the development of the country.

This blockade includes every enterprise where U.S. interests can give orders, preventing the sale to Cuba not only of industrial equipment but food, surgical materials and medicine. Our people have slowly learned to rise above and overcome this.

The technological basis of the mass media has been created or renovated, to a great degree, in television, movies, radio and, particularly, the graphics industry but the cultural needs of the country are greater than its printing ability. We can only slowly expand, improve or replace old equipment which suffers from the blockade and is aggravated by 20 years of continual use.

Other problems are related to the physical quality of our press.

Cuba manufactures paper but not in sufficient quantity or the different qualities that the press needs.

We buy our paper from the USSR and other equally distant countries and we have to save it for priority needs of education and information which we try to coordinate.

In fundamental services like public health and education, the revolution has overcome the effects of the blockade, achieving internationally recognized levels positively evaluated by sectors that are not at all friendly toward the Cuban revolution.

Nevertheless, in order to really know what those achievements mean, it is necessary to keep in mind that we must conquer very difficult obstacles starting from underdevelopment, illiteracy and poverty and, at the same time, confront the most developed capitalist country in the world which obstinately and criminally maintains such an inhumane and politically useless economic sanction.

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COMMENTARY EXPLORES ABUSE OF PUERTO RICANS BY GOVERNOR

Havana PRISMA LATINOAMERICANO in Spanish Nov 79 p 2

[Article by Carlos Mora Herman: "Cerro Maravilla"]

[Text] There are two events in the history of the long-suffering island of Puerto Rico that have singular parallelism: the 1937 massacre in Ponce and the 1978 murder of two independentista youths at Cerro Maravilla.

That mass murder in 1937 revealed the brutality of the colonial regime and the lack of scruples in its servants and lackeys.

The dignified voice of Rafael Perez Marchand, then attorney general of Ponce, was heard at that time. He carried out an in-depth investigation and accused four policemen of having committed the murders and other officials of being instigators and accomplices in the crime.

Blanton Winship, the governor of Puerto Rico at that time, wanted to force Marchand to change his testimony and go along with imperialist schemes to try to conceal the crime and accuse Puerto Rican nationalists of being the perpetrators.

Marchand did not yield and preferred to resign his position rather than give in to the dictates of the powerful Yankee who acted as administrator for the colonial regime.

The latest event which will be part of the history of struggle for independence and freedom of the Puerto Rican people occurred on 25 July 1978 at Cerro Maravilla in the town of Jayuya.

On that day two patriotic youths were taken to that hill, tricked by a common criminal in the pay of the colonial police who was carrying out a sinister plan concocted by the governor of the island, Carlos

Romero Barcelo, and his accomplices to "teach a lesson" to the independence movement in the country.

A month before, Romero Barcelo and his henchmen carried out a campaign against alleged terrorist plans by the independence fighters, plans actually made and directed by Barcelo's police and members of the U.S. intelligence community stationed in Puerto Rico.

The island was invaded by the Yankees on 25 July 1898 when the U.S. colonialists replaced the Spanish colonialists.

The people view that date as a day of infamy and each year show their repudiation of the colonialists.

Jayuya has heroic distinction because of an uprising by patriots there in 1952.

The governor and his police wanted to take a large group of independence fighters to Cerro Maravilla on 25 July 1978 to "teach them a lesson."

Then even prepared an ambush with the murderers stationed in strategic positions.

An informer named Alejandro Gonzalez Malave, a secret agent for the police, led the two youths, Carlos Enrique Soto Arregui and Arnaldo Dario Rosado, to their death.

The boys were unarmed. They were incapable of causing any harm.

The governor's murderers waited for them and pitilessly opened fire like wild beasts.

The bodies of Carlos Enrique and Arnaldo remained on the ground and they were not helped or taken to a hospital for hours.

Things were contrived so that what occurred looked like a subversive "attack" against the forces of order, an attempt to sabotage a television tower on Cerro Maravilla.

The truth filtered out over an entire year and contradictions among the policemen, the informer Malave and the governor himself flourished.

There was a wave of indignation throughout the island toward such a cowardly and unjustified crime.

The events at Cerro Maravilla become one more page in the heroic struggle of the people of Puerto Rico against a colonial power where

powerful officials in Washington collaborate with native traitors who carry out the crimes and obey the orders of their colonial masters.

It is the same situation as seen in other colonies with its heroes and its traitors.

The evidence that the Cerro Maravilla murders were the work of the governor, planned and directed from La Fortaleza where Romero Barcelo resides, is becoming increasingly clearer to the Puerto Rican people.

The Washington government shows up as clumsy and compromised in this case as in many other cases. Power based on abuse, crime and lies cannot be maintained.

The truth hurts, especially to the U.S. Government which tries to go against the tide of history and perpetuate its control and exploitation of lands and peoples who are capable of giving man's most precious gift--life--for their ideals of independence and freedom as Carlos Enrique and Arnaldo did, as many have done before and as all those who are convinced that sooner or later Puerto Rico will become a free nation will continue to do.

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UNPUBLISHED INTERVIEW WITH FSLN FOUNDER PRINTED

Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 16 Nov 79 pp 50-55

[Interview with Carlos Fonseca Amador, the founder of the Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN), by Uruguayan journalist Ernesto Gonzalez Bermejo, at the Capri Hotel in Havana, November 1970]

[Text] After intensive searches and explorations, the tomb containing the remains of Carlos Fonseca Amador, the founder of the FSLN, was finally discovered in Wasiala, north of the Nicaraguan capital. He had been wounded in a confrontation with the National Guard and murdered by Somoza's henchmen the following day, 7 November 1976. Savagely tortured, Fonseca's body was found with no hands, because his murderers had cut them off to show them to the tyrant Anastasio Somoza Debayle in an exhibition of flagrant barbarism. Three years later, this past 7 November, the people of free Nicaragua met in Revolution Square in Managua to pay their last respects to the heroic leader and to inter his remains with military honors. "Carlos Fonseca Amador is one of the men who never die," was the rallying cry of that celebration, which also included ceremonies of commemoration and homage in Wasiala and Matagalpa. Today BOHEMIA offers its readers this interview with the Sandinist leader, a valuable testimony reflecting not only the most poignant moments in his revolutionary life but also the major landmarks in the most recent history of the Nicaraguan people.

If anyone had deserved to triumphantly enter the Somoza bunker in Loma de Tiscapa above shattered Managua, it would have been Carlos Fonseca Amador, the founder of the Sandinist National

Liberation Movement in 1962. But Fonseca died in combat on 8 November 1976 in the Zinica Mountains along the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua, after a life totally dedicated to battling Somoza for the liberation of his country.

When I met him in November 1970 at the Capri Hotel in Havana, that absurdly decorated example of bourgeois bad taste, it had not been long since he had been released from his nth prison cell (this time in Costa Rica), thanks to an exchange worked out by his Sandinist comrades. He was a tall, thin man with unruly hair and fragile glasses, the air of the eternal student, the voice and expression of a visionary, one of those romantic revolutionaries who, against all the evidence, wind up bei g right.

After a guerrilla itinerary replete with snags, falls and deaths, which he recons ructs in this unpublished interview, Fonseca Amador injected me with an optimism about the future of the revolutionary struggle in Nicaragua that was unexplainable in 1970. Everything seems clear today, but 9 years ago Somoza, like Pinochet, Videla, the Uruguayan soldiers and Stroessner today, was proclaiming the myth of the invulnerability of tyrants, a myth that was shattered by the Sandinist victory, of which Fonseca Amador was one of the major silent architects.

This was what we talked about that evening:

[Question] I would like you to begin by telling me a little bit about yourself, your family origins, your joining the revolutionary struggle. I understand that you come from a family with links to the Somoza regime.

[Answer] I began to take part in Nicaragua's revolutionary struggle during my years in secondary school. In primary school I had already had a few experiences with rebelling against the tyranny. Our third grade teacher was fired because she was accused of being anti-Somoza. We children left the school and decided to finish the school year (I'm talking about 1947) by attending classes at her home. I recall that one of my schoolmates, Manuel Balbison took part years later with me in a guerrilla operation in which he was killed and I was wounded in the lungs.

[Question] Where were you born?

[Answer] I was born in 1936 in the department of Matagalpa, in northern Nicaragua. Matagalpa is also the name of the municipal capital. The cities in Nicaragua are small. This is a small city and is part of the Segovia region.

[Question] What kind of crops are grown there?

[Answer] It is a coffee-growing, livestock and grain region. Although it has important crops, as far as the country's economy is concerned large feudal estates are more prevalent there than in other regions, where the large estates are more capitalist-oriented.

[Question] And what about your family?

[Answer] My mother is a very poor woman who earns her living by working as a maid in the homes of the wealthy, the large estate owners who reside in the city of Matagalpa. My father, Fausto Amador, on the other hand, has ties to the reactionary, anti-people's regime in Nicaragua. He is no less than the general administrator of the property of the Somoza family. I lived with my mother during my childhood and youth.

[Question] When and why did your early natural rebelliousness begin to turn into an awareness?

[Answer] I got my first notions of a revolutionary awareness towards the end of secondary school, around 1954. I began to realize that the struggle in my country was not only to defeat a power group but a system as well. I was influenced by the experience of Guatemala, which had a short-lived people's government around that time.

[Question] Were you mature enough at the time of Jacobo Arbenz's fall to grasp the mechanisms of his overthrow?

[Answer] Of course. We were already able to share the sadness of the imperialist overthrow of Arbenz's democratic government. That's the truth.

[Question] Was there any sort of student organization at the time?

[Answer] In secondary school a group of comrades and I set up the first student committee in the institute. We also had ties with the extremely weak labor movement that existed in the country and with the very few Marxist cells at the time. In 1955 I entered the university, where we set up a communist cell, which was also the first ever formed within the student movement. We carried out a number of activities and got some press.

[Question] In other words, you had ties with the Communis Party.

[Answer] In a way, yes; I was regarded as a member of the Communist Party. But the modest work that I did in the student sphere at the time, given the weakness of the incipient revolutionary movement, stemmed more from my own initiative than from orders I received from the party.

[Question] When did you first become a political prisoner?

[Answer] In 1956, when I was 20 years old. I was arrested in connection with the execution of the tyrant Anastasio Somoza by revolutionary poet Rigoberto Lopez Perez. I honestly was not involved in that operation, but I did have personal ties to rebels who took part in the execution. We even published a student newspaper, EL UNIVERSITARIO, which was put out at a printing house owned by Elias Castro, who had taken part in the operation.

[Question] How long were you held?

[Answer] Two months. I was transferred from Matagalpa Prison to Managua. I was treated harshly, complete solitary confinement, beatings. We had not yet become hardened, and that minor experience with repression served as a test for us. In reality, the ones who suffered the most were the comrades who had taken part in Somoza's execution.

[Question] Like Elias Castro?

[Answer] Like Castro, Cornelio Silva and Alberto Narvaez. They were tortured, imprisoned for 4 years and then brutally murdered in jail.

[Question] And what about after your imprisonment?

[Answer] We continued being active in the student movement, trying to give it the revolutionary, anti-imperialist, alliance with the lower classes character that it did not yet have.

[Question] What kind of operations did you undertake?

[Answer] The operation against Milton Eisenhower, for example. In 1957 I had taken part in the World Youth Congress, which was sponsored by the World Federation of Democratic Youth and held in the Soviet Union, and in the Fourth World Labor Union Congress, which was organized by the World Labor Union Federation. I was outside the country for 4 months. Shortly after my return, we learned that Milton Eisenhower, a representative of the imperialist

government of the United States, was coming to receive an honorary degree from the reactionary board that governed the university. We students announced that we were not going to permit the name of Nicaragua to be humiliated, and Eisenhower did not dare to visit the university. We prevented this show of servility by the university board.

[Question] By 1958 was your country feeling the influence of the Cuban guerrillas who were fighting in the Sierra Maestra?

[Answer] Of course, and that influence was decisive. The example of the Cuban people, youth and guerrilla fighters played a decisive role in the incipient development of the political process in Nicaragua, which had undergone a brutal interruption in 1934.

In 1958 major student assemblies were held, and for the first time in many years the name of Augusto Cesar Sandino resounded once again in Nicaragua, after a quarter of a century of darkness, paralysis and atrophy of the Nicaraguan people's movement. In 1958 the country also saw its first guerrilla operation, headed up by a surviving member of the old Sandino guerrillas, Ramon Raudales, who was killed in that combat.

[Question] Was the guerrilla movement starting to organize?

[Answer] No; it was an isolated operation in Yaule, in the northern part of the country. There were also isolated operations in 1959. During one of them I took up arms for the first time against the tyranny; this was the El Chaparral operation.

[Question] What was that operation like?

[Answer] We were preparing for the operation on Honduran territory near the Nicaraguan border. There were students, workers, craftsmen, a few former military personnel, young people in general. There were 54 of us. We were totally inexperienced, without mobility, without adequate security and even without minimal contacts with the town in which we were to carry out the operation; a great many limitations, in short. As we were about to enter Nicaraguan territory, we were spotted, still in Honduras, in a region known as El Chaparral.

[Question] Did they surround you?

[Answer] They surrounded us. There were Honduran military forces and Somoza's National Guard (there can be no doubt about this because a few comrades who survived were even interrogated by the National Guard). We were surrounded. Some comrades wanted to resist to the very end, but there was nothing we could do. The terrain was unsuited

for defending ourselves; there was a ravine (a "quique" as they also call it), and the military forces were coming in from above. Our posts were poorly located, so close to the camp that there were practically no posts at all.

[Question] How did the battle end?

[Answer] The group was annihilated. We were not all exterminated because the terrain, despite its drawbacks, provided minimum cover in a spur of the mountains by the border region.

[Question] How did you come out of the attack?

[Answer] With a wound through my thorax. I still have the scar; the bullet entered here in my chest and emerged from my back. It went right through me. We were taken as prisoners to Tegucigalpa, and there, thanks to a rally by the Honduran people's movement, we were released and sent to Cuba. I spent a week here in Havana, taking part in the joyous victory of the Cuban people in 1959.

[Question] What conclusion did you reach at the time on the basis of your guerrilla experiences?

[Answer] That the armed struggle was the only path that could lead to revolutionary change in Nicaragua and that we had to bring together Nicaraguan revolutionary elements and organize ourselves properly.

[Question] How did you reach that conclusion?

[Answer] In Nicaragua you do not have to do a lot of thinking to become convinced that weapons are the only viable method...At that point we could already see that in our country's history not even the two oligarchical bands that arose with our independence from Spain were ever able to peacefully succeed each other in power. They always did so by dint of arms. So then, what hope for a peaceful change could a revolutionary movement have? Moreover, it was easy to see that the National Guard, the reactionary armed contingent, was all-powerful in Nicaragua. The military commander of a department is the master of the department; the civilian authorities are mere decoration in Nicaragua.

[Question] Wasn't there any period during which we might speak of bourgeois democracy?

[Answer] That was always a very incipient thing in Nicaragua. Rather than bourgeois democracy, what did come to exist at one point

was a kind of bourgeois nationalist government that when it developed to a degree, also committed repressive excesses.

[Question] You mentioned that in 1958, for the first time in many years, the name of Augusto Cesar Sandino was again heard in public. What had happened with his memory prior to this?

[Answer] It was spoken of in hushed tones for many long years. Amid the terror, the obscurantism, the domination by the reactionary parties, the conservatism of the Nicaraguan intelligentsia, Sandino's name was a murmur...I was 10 or 12 years old when I heard Sandino spoken of. People said that a distant relative of the family had been a guerrilla fighter with him and had been murdered in the Coyol Basin along with many other rebels.

[Question] What was the official version concerning Sandino?

[Answer] They tried to portray him as a bandit, but the natural instinct of the people was not to be fooled, especially because it was Anastasio Somoza, his murderer, who was saying it.

[Question] It was clear to the people that Somoza was directly responsible for Sandino's death?

[Answer] The simplest of people knew about that.

[Question] What happened during what you call the "quarter century of obscurantism"? Weren't there attempts at rebellion against the dictatorship?

[Answer] There were, constantly, but they were individual, sporadic acts of rebellion. Dissatisfaction with the existing situation leads a person of lower-class extraction to rebel, but there was neither a revolutionary awareness nor organization.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Because for various reasons Marxism did not penetrate Nicaragua for many, many years. Marxism, we could say, entered and took root in a wideranging segment of the population and Nicaraguan youth, with the triumph of the Cuban Revolution.

[Question] Why did it lag behind other Latin American countries?

[Answer] Because Nicaragua is a country with a feudal, livestock-raising and coffee-growing economy, surrounded by countries that also have feudal economies; because it did not have the influx of European immigrant workers who brought revolutionary ideas, as other Latin American countries had. The family names in Nicaragua are those of

the Spanish conquerers. To the contrary, what occurred was emigration. Today there are practically one million Nicaraguans outside the country and two million inside.

[Question] You mentioned to me that in 1959, after a week in Cuba, you went back to Nicaragua for the purpose of organizing the guerrilla struggle. What happened then?

[Answer] I hooked up with the Nicaraguans who were living in Costa Rica and had participated there in the struggles against the Yankee fruit monopolies. We felt we had to establish ties with our people, and I entered Nicaragua secretly in 1960 to try and organize clandestine urban work that would enable us to prepare for rural guerrilla fighting and launch the general struggle in the country.

[Question] That had never been tried before?

[Answer] It was the first attempt. The extremely weak Marxist movement that had existed in the country since 1944 always tried to conform to legal activities, the minimal legal maneuvering room that was possible in the country. For 16 years that prevented a combative underground organization from developing.

[Question] What happened with your endeavor in 1960?

[Answer] We came up against enormous difficulties and made a lot of mistakes. On top of our own personal lack of experience, we were weighed down by the lack of experience of previous generations. The country had a tradition of rebellions, but they belonged to the distant past. Then came the interruption that we spoke of previously. They captured me and exiled me to Guatemala in July 1960. It was the second time that I had been thrown out of the country. They had banished me previously in 1959 for my student activism, before the El Chaparral operation. They put me in jail in Guatemala.

[Question] Where?

[Answer] In the Peten region, in a town called Poptun. Luis Augusto Turcios Lima* was on duty there. With jailers like him I didn't have such a bad time.

[Question] What was Turcios Lima like at that time?

[Answer] He was one of the youngest soldiers there. They were sub-lieutenants, just out of military school, and you could talk with

*An outstanding Guatemalan revolutionary leader who was killed in an automobile accident in 1966.

them. Strangely enough, however, even the old reactionary military men there said that Somoza was a bandit and a murderer.

[Question] And what did you talk about with Turcios?

[Answer] About the role of young people, the major developments that were happening in our countries, the way that problems had to be resolved, changes, political conversations. Turcios even gave me some ideas about the use of dynamite, which shows the degree of trust that we developed in just a few days.

[Question] He was already very much aware politically.

[Answer] No; I would be exaggerating if I said that, but he did listen. I want to be honest; I don't want portray myself as a prophet. In reality, at that time I did not think that Turcios was going to become such an outstanding activist in the revolutionary movement in Guatemala and in Latin America even.

He was very discreet. He just listened and from time to time voiced an opinion. It was up to me to do the talking there; I was known as a revolutionary, not them.

[Question] How did you get out of that prison?

[Answer] I slipped away. It was a town, a military settlement, and the repression in Guatemala was not even remotely like what it got to be after the Zacato and Puerto Barrios uprisings. They gave me a certain degree of freedom. For example, I could go buy things at places near the Police Headquarters. One day (Turcios was not on guard duty) I slipped away.

I had managed to get out a few letters by having privates take them to the post office in the adjacent region. I got in touch with Nicaragua and said where I was, and when everything was ready, I escaped and returned to my country to begin organizing the guerrilla movement again.

[Question] At what point can we begin to speak of the existence of the Sandinist Front?

[Answer] As of 1962. Towards the end of 1960 we began thinking about the creation of an independent organization to prepare the revolutionary armed struggle in Nicaragua. In 1961 we began to take practical steps in that direction, and the Sandinist Front was born in 1962. It was made up of men who were involved in the various isolated operations that had been undertaken previously in an unplanned, uncoordinated manner. We were also accompanied by a

number of veterans of the past struggles that Sandino headed up, such as Comrade Santos Lopez, a heroic survivor of those operations.

[Question] He died, didn't he?

[Answer] Yes. He accompanied us on a guerrilla operation and experienced a great many difficulties that are to be expected in the mountains; he was an old man by that time. He contracted a serious illness that eventually killed him.

[Question] So the Sandinist Front was founded. Then what happened?

[Answer] We came up against a serious problem: the influence that the traditional parties, which are very strong in my country, still had, in contrast to other countries in Latin America. These two parties, the liberals and the conservatives, have survived for one and a half centuries.

[Question] They acted in total complicity to maintain the tyranny, together with the imperialists. Somoza availed himself directly of no less than the Liberal Party (the government party), while the Conservative Party engaged in a pro forma opposition in total complicity.

Naturally, during the time of the elder Somoza, when there was not the slightest revolutionary awareness in the country, the two parties managed to paralyze the people's struggle; they won over the desperate masses, who were yearning for a change. We realized then that the greater the difficulties, the greater was our obligation to tackle them and intensify our efforts, and we took the preparatory steps for a guerrilla operation: we organized an expedition in the northern part of the country, in the area by the Coco and Bocay rivers.

[Question] Why did you choose that area?

[Answer] There was a certain degree of improvisation, unquestionably. A string of more or less fortuitous developments drew us to that area, which had various drawbacks: isolation (the most isolated section of northern Nicaragua, we might say), a very small and backward population, a primitive economy. The guerrilla struggle suffered another setback.

A number of valuable comrades from the university perished: Jorge Navarro, Francisco Buitrago, Ivan Arguello, Mauricio Cordoba, Juan F. Santamaria, Faustino Ruiz, Modesto. All of them died in that rash guerrilla operation.

[Question] Did the guerrilla struggle succeed in upsetting the country's oligarchy and the dictatorship?

[Answer] It is not easy to tell to what extent. The fact is, our setback coincided with a maneuver by the oligarchy to organize an election farce and put in a docile fellow like Rene Schik in an attempt to instill hopes in a number of segments of the population, inasmuch as a person who did not belong to the Somoza family would be taking over for the first time.

[Question] And what was Schik's relationship with the Somozas?

[Answer] Schik had always been in the employ of the Somozas and he continued to be. But a people who had been divorced from political life and were accustomed to associating the tyranny with a name, were susceptible to fall for the maneuver. Together with the setback that we had suffered, this caused us to interrupt our armed activities for a few months.

[Question] You entered a period of "building up forces," didn't you?

[Answer] Exactly. We employed more or less overt methods, along with clandestine ones, but dispensed with direct armed action for a while.

[Question] With what results?

[Answer] Experience taught us that the interruption weakened the morale and enthusiasm of our militants, and the so-called "buildup" was really just powerlessness. For a number of reasons Nicaraguan revolutionaries have to experience the armed struggle to a certain extent in order to devote their energies to revolutionary activities.

[Question] So you made adjustments?

[Answer] Yes, and in 1966 we again took practical steps to undertake direct rural and urban armed action against the tyranny. We were the only political force in Nicaragua that opposed the election farce that the tyranny was preparing in order to directly implant a member of the family, Anastasio Somoza Jr. The bourgeois opposition played along with this maneuver by running a candidate, Fernando Aguero, a large estate owner from the Amadeo region.

A certain so-called revolutionary sector unfortunately also went along with the argument (if it can be called an argument) that it was through the electoral process that we had to make contact with the masses and that even if we did not do so, we could take advantage of the rallies that the electoral process could trigger in the country.

[Question] Did you undertake armed actions during this period?

[Answer] Yes. In 1963 we carried out the first recovery action in Nicaragua against a banking institution; that was in Managua. In the same year, on the occasion of Kennedy's meeting with the Central American puppets in Costa Rica, on 20 March we occupied a radio station, arms in hand, to tell the people of the imperialist and reactionary nature of the meeting. And perhaps most importantly, we made contacts in the field with a certain mass movement of peasant farmers. We managed to undertake a few struggles for the land, and this surely made it somewhat easier for us to establish a guerrilla base later on.

[Question] When and where did you establish that base?

[Answer] In 1966 and 1967 we set ourselves up in the Pancasan region, in the central section of the country, and remained there for a year. It is a coffee-growing and livestock region. There is extensive livestock-raising, using a very primitive technique (even though it is the country's main livestock region), and a milk company has recently been set up there with investments from the Nestle firm. It is going to be processing company for all of Central America, what the Americans call an integrated industry.

[Question] What are the living conditions like for peasant farmers in that area?

[Answer] They work no more than 3 months a year, during the coffee harvest. Most of the land is divided into very large estates. For most of the year the peasants stave off hunger with salted corn; fats are unknown to them. They spend any money that they have on cooked beans, and if they ever get to buy a little meat, they make soup. Nearby, in the department of Matagalpa, which covers 9,000 square kilometers, more than 100 persons have starved to death in just a few days. You can frequently see children there who are inflamed by starvation, with their faces, bodies and flesh yellow and inflamed. Night blindness due to a lack of protein also occurs in the municipality of Dario no less, which bears the name because the poet Ruben Dario was born there.

Goiters are endemic and very common there. In other sections of the same area there have been cases of collective dementia caused by starvation. There are entire towns whose only food is old corn, because it is cheaper, but which has lost all of its nutritive qualities. They are driven insane with hunger and go around killing each other. This has happened in the Malacahuas district.

[Question] Did those peasants support the guerrillas?

[Answer] Some sort of myth has been created that the guerrilla struggle has failed because of lack of support from the people. That is not true. We had the support of a segment of the population. Whether we were able to find a way to organize this support for combat or not is another matter. This is something that requires great care and a certain artistry, we might say. For example, we found ourselves bringing together peasants from opposite regions and taking them to areas that were not their own, and a number of them deserted. And what became of them? They went back to their native regions and waged a guerrilla struggle on their own. They were precarious guerrillas, to be sure, because they lacked leadership. Nevertheless, they did expropriate from wealthy merchants in the area, for example, which reflected a determination to struggle. So, it is not enough to give a peasant a rifle; you also have to find work for him to do and a place for him to operate.

[Question] Did you engage the National Guard in combat that year?

[Answer] Yes, during the final period, and some of our comrades died there. Danilo Rosales, who was a university professor, Silvio Mayorga, Francisco Moreno, Otto Casco, Carlos Tinoco, Carlos Reina, Ernesto Fernandez, Fausto Garcia all fell during that guerrilla struggle.

A brutal offensive was launched against the Sandinist Front at that time. Peasant farmers like Fermin Diaz and his children, Felipe Gaitan, Oscar Hernandez Flores, who was a grower, and many others were skinned alive by the National Guard.

A savage repression was also unleashed in the cities. Casimiro Sotelo, a Sandinist Front representative at the LASO [Latin American Solidarity Organization] Conference, and several other comrades were captured right in Managua in the plain view of everyone, taken to Loma de Tiscapa, where Somoza has his throne, and murdered there. David Tejada, a student leader, was rifle-butted to death by Oscar Morales, Somoza's main aide; he removed the eyes from the boy's body and threw it into a volcano.

[Question] How did the situation develop after that?

[Answer] We managed to reorganize somewhat in 1968, and in 1969 another brutal repression was unleashed. When it would locate the hideout of a comrade, the National Guard would send in 200 armed troops backed by tanks and even planes. That happened on 15 July 1969 simultaneously in two Managua districts, the Santo Domingo and Las Delicias del Volga districts. It happened again on 15 January and 3 April 1970.

The first aggression was directed against 10 comrades. Julio Buitrago, a former student leader, shook the conscience of young people and the entire nation by resisting that avalanche of military might alone in a house for almost 2 hours until his last bullet. His body was removed from the rubble and taken away in order to ward off the display of public mourning that was going to take place at his burial. Three other comrades died along with Buitrago: Marcos Rivera, Anibal Castillo and Alesio Baldon.

On 15 January 1970, under similar conditions, the young poet Leonel Rugama and two other comrades resisted to the death. On 3 April the same thing happened with guerrilla fighter Luisa Espinosa and Comrade Enrique Lorente in the city of Leon.

[Question] It is one of the fiercest repressions on the continent.

[Answer] And I do not think that it is sufficiently well-known, even though everyone is familiar with the tyranny of the Somozas. There is an occupation army in Nicaragua. The National Guard was created expressly to pursue Sandinist patriots; it was formed as a result of Yankee intervention and from its beginnings it has had a tradition, the practices and the structure of an army of occupation. For example, it has a governing commander, a post that is characteristic only of occupying forces.

[Question] Aside from the obvious ones (exploitation of the country's natural resources), what specific objectives is the United States pursuing in Nicaragua?

[Answer] Control of the country's potential inter-oceanic waterway is very important. That is the reason why the Yankee government has been attacking Nicaragua ever since the last century. There were American armed interventions against the country in 1848, 1854 and 1855, and they are still going on to this day, although since it has had the Somozas as ruthless guardians, they have been basically political.

But there is something else. The United States is also thinking about eventually building an oil pipeline in Nicaragua to link the two oceans. The oil monopolies have problems transporting the oil extracted in Alaska because the supertankers cannot make it through the Panama Canal. That is why it is interested in building the pipeline in Nicaragua, and there has been talk that the honorable Aristotle Onassis is involved in this undertaking.

Lastly, Nicaragua also serves the United States as a base from which to attack other countries. The expedition headed by Castillo Armas and organized by the CIA that put an end to the constitutional government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala left from Nicaragua. The people who invaded Cuba by the Bay of Pigs in 1961 left from Puerto Cabezas, and other armed incursions against Cuba have left from Puntamico, from bases that the Americans have set up in Nicaragua.

Somoza is an unconditional ally of imperialism. He was even the only Latin American head of state who in October 1967 publicly offered to send a contingent of troops to Vietnam.

[Question] You were arrested again. Under what circumstances?

[Answer] In early 1969 the organization felt it was necessary to draw up a series of analytical documents on the serious problems that the revolutionary movement was facing and, given the fierce repression in Nicaragua, sent me to Costa Rica to head up the drafting of those documents. In August 1969 my presence in San Jose coincided with a a harsh crackdown by the Costa Rican Government against the Nicaraguan revolutionaries living there. Because of my unfamiliarity with that sector in that country, the Costa Rican forces of repression located and captured me.

I was held for more than a year in Costa Rica. My imprisonment, like that of any Nicaraguan revolutionary, was repudiated by the Costa Rican people, who cannot tolerate the jailing in their country of people who rebel against the Somoza dictatorship.

In this context, a plane was hijacked on Costa Rican territory and flown to the Colombian island of San Andres with four American technicians from the United Fruit Company aboard. There they demanded our release (three other comrades and myself); otherwise, reprisals would be taken against the Americans. The Costa Rican Government gave in, to a great extent, I think, because Mr Jose Figueres was at the UN assembly in the United States. Figueres came out publicly against our release. From Costa Rica we went to Mexico and from Mexico we headed for Cuba, where we were welcomed with the internationalist solidarity that is characteristic of the Cuban Revolution.

[Question] In conclusion, what prospects do you see for the Sandinist Front's struggle? Will Somoza be around for a long time?

[Answer] I am optimistic about the future of the revolutionary struggle in Nicaragua, which does not mean that I do not see the major difficulties and obstacles that we have in front of us. The struggle will be long, hard and bloody. We have already achieved a number of

major objectives, such as breaking the hold that the two traditional parties had over the Nicaraguan people. The Sandinist Front is a mass movement that has caught on among peasant farmers, not only where the guerrillas have fought, but all over country as well. The influence that the traditional parties might still have is fading, in total decay. Never in the country's history have these parties entered a stage of such major decay. The world press has reported on the collusion that individuals like Fernando Aguero, the rancher and large estate owner from the Conservative Party, have engaged in with the Liberal Party's Anastasio Somoza Jr.

As we set out to continue the revolutionary struggle, we are guided by the most advanced principles, by Marxist ideology, by Commander Ernesto "Che" Guevara, by Augusto Cesar Sandino. We realize that socialism is the only prospect that our peoples have for achieving a deep-seated change in their living conditions. This does not mean that we exclude persons who do not think exactly like us, and although we feel that the fundamental guide must be the principles of scientifc socialism, we are willing to march together with people of the most varied beliefs who are interested in toppling the tyranny and liberating our country.

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POLITICAL DELEGATES NAMED, DUTIES OUTLINED

Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 29 Nov 79 p 16

[Text] The Ministry of the Interior has named the political delegates of the country's various departments.

Enrique Smith, the Interior Ministry director who coordinates all of the political delegates, said that he felt that the comrades who have been appointed to serve as delegates have the qualities needed to grasp and properly resolve the problems of the departments.

The duties of political delegates will be to maintain the public order, and to pursue investigations into crimes against the peace and security of the republic or against any state institution and to report them to the Interior Ministry.

In addition, they will coordinate the proper functioning of state agencies in each department and call for, when needed, the assistance of the department police and the army in incidents involving the public order and the tranquility of the state.

They must also pursue smugglers and those who forge and alter currency and credit instruments of the national treasury, regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages, see to it that gambling laws are enforced, and request reports from the Sandinist National Police on the revenues and expenditures of those branches, while seeing to it that all revenues are justified by payment slips or any other tool of administrative control, which will be sent as soon as possible to the Interior Ministry.

The following are the names of the political delegates that were given to us: Jesus Vilchez, from the department of Leon; Franco Montealegre, Chinandega; Juan Matus, Matagalpa; Javier Moncada, Masaya; Rene Orue, Carazo; Wilfredo Barreto, Rivas; Francisco Montoya, Chontales; Alonso Porras, Jinotega; Javier Alvarez, Granada, and Melvin Ayerdis, Boaca.

The delegates were interviewed briefly concerning the exercise of their functions and the problems that they face.

They stated that in a number of areas, such as Rivas and Chontales, cases of smuggling have occurred, which are being investigated in order to come up with evidence and mete out revolutionary justice to those threatening the economy of the people.

Cases of livestock and cocoa smuggling have occurred in the Rivas area and are being controlled as police vigilance is boosted.

The officials who will be performing these functions will have a fixed salary of 5,000 to 6,000 cordobas, to prevent what used to happen in the past when political chiefs pocketed money at will and became wealthier every day at the expense of the people and under the wing of the defeated tyranny.

The political delegates will serve for 1 or a maximum of 2 years, the second year being optional.

With the appointment of the political delegates the hope is to decentralize somewhat the problems that arise daily in the Interior Ministry and to exercise greater control over the abuses of power by members of the army and police and over the disturbances that a number of opportunists want to create in order to destabilize the revolution.

Wilfredo Barreto,
Rivas delegate

Alonso Porras,
Jinotega delegate

Rene Orue,
Carazo delegate



Javier Moncada,
Masaya delegate



Franco Montealegre,
Chinandega delegate

Juan Matus,
Matagalpa delegate

Javier Alvarez,
Granada delegate

Francisco Montoya,
Chontales delegate

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RURAL MOUNTED POLICE ORGANIZED IN GRANADA

Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 29 Nov 79 p 5

[Text] Granada--The Rural Mounted Police has been created in this city on the initiative of Comrade Emmet Lang Salmeron, in response to an appeal from our peasant farmers, reported Comrade Orlando Aguilera Martinez, the head of the staff of the Sandinist National Police in this city.

Aguilera stated that there would be intensive patrolling of the countryside to protect our rural brothers from drug addicts, murderers and rustlers. The initiative by Comrade Lang, who served as chief of staff in Granada, was approved by Comrade Rene Vivas, the head of the General Command of the Sandinist National Police (PNS).

Comrade Aguilera added that this same system is going to be extended to other departments in line with the organizational chart of the PNS staff; it is of vital importance for protecting peasant farmers.

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BANK WORKERS UNION SHOULD PROMOTE NEW MENTALITY, PAPER SAYS

Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 29 Nov 79 p 15

[Text] The members of the Union of Workers of the Central Bank of Nicaragua (SITRABANIC) are aware of the need for a new mentality in order to transform public servants into consistent revolutionaries. Seminars, political talks and studies circles are being held for this purpose.

BARRICADA interviewed Comrades Adan Bermudez, a delegate from the Sandinist Workers Union; Jose Dolores Berrios, from the organizational division, and Orlando Mogollon, the director of finances, and they explained to us that the union was born after the triumph, inasmuch as all attempts at organization were thwarted during the time of the Somoza dictatorship.

"We want our upper- and lower-level employees to change their outlook, which was encouraged by Somoza to create problems involving elites," Berrios said. The problem at the Central Bank of Nicaragua is that most of the upper-level employees are specialized technicians who used to receive fat salaries, in addition to special daily expense allowances.

The Central Bank of Nicaragua was the "while elephant" of the financial system. Workers received, in addition to their salaries, a bond equivalent to half their pay every 6 months and a Christmas bonus amounting to 2 months pay. They also had an assistance and retirement fund in which they deposited 5 percent of their salary; upon retirement they would remove all their money plus 100 percent interest, which the bank would cover.

This was unquestionably beneficial to Central Bank employees, so much so that they came to be regarded as privileged bank workers.

Our comrades at the union have now told us that the matter of the savings fund has been resolved by improving the pension system of the Nicaraguan Social Security Institute and by forming a savings cooperative.

Our comrades pointed out that echoing the cry of "Let's Boost Output," they have intensified efforts to enhance service to the public. As part of consciousness-raising efforts they have formed coffee-harvesting brigades that will be traveling to Carazo next Sunday.

This is so that technicians will be able to see what the situation is really like among our peasant farmers and to gain an awareness of what we are doing for them. Comrade Mogollon pointed out that an appeal has been issued to unit and department heads to plan the necessary work and not lapse into bureaucratic practices.

The SITRABANIC is made up of more than 300 workers, and the hope is that there will be 100 percent membership in the next few days. An office has been outfitted, and the Sandinist Workers Union is serving as a consultant to achieve this goal.

A magazine entitled MARCHEMOS is being published to raise the political level of the members. Comrade Mogollon told us that they are working in conjunction with SITRABANIC and that next Saturday a seminar would be held to take a look at the current political situation. There are ambitious plans to eventually form a Studies Center at the level of the national financial system.

Inasmuch as public servants no longer have to have an anti-employer attitude, the union was structured in accordance with current demands. Therefore, instead of the traditional posts we now have heads of organization, culture and political education, publicity and finances. There is also a director of human resources, whose job is to place the bank employees who used to work at foreign banks and are now unemployed.

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